



**JEAN  
MONNET**

EU model

Jean Monnet Module  
“Moving the EU forward”

**Athens EU Model 2018**  
**24 - 27 April 2018, Athens, Greece**

## **GUIDELINES**

**Simulation of the European Commission  
and Council of the European Union**

**Topic: “EU accession negotiations of Balkan states”**



Co-funded by the  
Erasmus+ Programme  
of the European Union



# CONTENTS

1. Programme at a Glance
2. Preparatory lectures' syllabus
  - 2.1. Programme
  - 2.2. Literature
  - 2.3. Position Paper Guidelines
3. Rules of procedure
  - i. Language
  - ii. Role of the Board
  - iii. Delegations
  - iv. Seating Arrangement
  - v. Quorum, Attendance and Roll Call
  - vi. Assignment of Agenda Items / Setting the Agenda
  - vii. Debate Format
  - viii. Points and Motions
  - ix. Tour de Table
  - x. Working Papers
  - xi. Draft Conclusions
  - xii. Amendments on a Draft Conclusion
  - xiii. Voting Procedures
  - xiv. Closure of Debate
  - xv. Judging and Awards
4. Study guides
  - 4.1. Institutional Framework
    - 4.1.1. The European Commission
    - 4.1.2. Decision making process
    - 4.1.3. Ordinary legislative procedure
    - 4.1.4. Council of the European Union
    - 4.1.5. Decision making process in the Council
    - 4.1.6. Ordinary legislative procedure
  - 4.2 EU Accession Procedure
    - 4.2.1. Articles 2 & 49 of the Treaty on EU
    - 4.2.2. Accession (Copenhagen) Criteria
    - 4.2.3. Absorption capacity and enlargement fatigue
    - 4.2.4. Acquis Communautaire
    - 4.2.5. Steps towards joining
  - 4.3. The role of the Commission in the Accession Procedure
    - 4.3.1. Role during negotiations
    - 4.3.2. Screening
    - 4.3.3. The evolution of the European Commission's positions
  - 4.4. The role of the Council of EU in the Accession Procedure
  - 4.5. The framework of relations between the EU and the Western Balkan countries - The Stabilisation and Association Process
    - 4.5.1. Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA)
    - 4.5.2. Autonomous trade measures
    - 4.5.3. Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)
    - 4.5.4. Regional Cooperation

- 4.6. EU Relations with the Western Balkans
  - 4.6.1. The Thessaloniki European Council 2003
  - 4.6.2. The Berlin Process
  - 4.6.3. Stage of Negotiations
  - 4.6.4. Points of Agreement and Disagreement
- 4.7. Points to be addressed
- 4.8. Bibliography

## 5. Organisers

- 5.1 The Institute of European Integration and Policy
- 5.2. The Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration
- 5.3. The National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- 5.4. Organising team

## 6. Useful Information

- 6.1. The City of Athens
- 6.2. TOP 10 things to do in Athens
- 6.3. Before you travel to Greece
- 6.4. Information and emergency phone numbers in Greece

## 7. Contact details



# 1. Programme at a Glance

DATE	ACTIVITY	TIME	LOCATION
<b>Thursday 22/03/2018</b>	<b>1st Preparatory Lecture</b> Title: The EU institutions and their role in the accession procedure Tutor: Othon Kaminiaris, IEIP Junior Research Fellow	<b>13:00 - 16:00</b>	42 - 44, Aiolou Str., Monastiraki area (room 4, 2nd floor)
<b>Monday 26/03/2018</b>	<b>2nd Preparatory Lecture</b> Title: The interaction between domestic/regional politics and the process of European integration in the Western Balkans (Part I) Tutor: Associate Professor Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos	<b>13:00 - 16:00</b>	42 - 44, Aiolou Str., Monastiraki area (room 4 , 2nd floor)
<b>Tuesday 27/03/2018</b>	<b>3rd Preparatory Lecture</b> Title: The interaction between domestic/regional politics and the process of European integration in the Western Balkans (Part II) Tutor: Associate Professor Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos	<b>13:00 - 16:00</b>	42 - 44, Aiolou Str., Monastiraki area (room 4 , 2nd floor)
<b>Tuesday 10/04/2018</b>	<b>Position Papers submission deadline</b>	<b>23:59</b>	
<b>Tuesday 24/04/2018</b>	<b>Registration</b>	<b>09:30 - 10:00</b>	30, Panepistimiou Ave. (Argyriades Hall, central building of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens)
	<b>Opening Ceremony</b>	<b>10:00 - 12:00</b>	30, Panepistimiou Ave. (Argyriades Hall, central building of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens)
	<b>Session</b>	<b>13:00 - 16:00</b>	42 - 44, Aiolou Str., Monastiraki area (room 4, 2nd floor & room 6, 3rd floor)
<b>Wednesday 25/04/2018</b>	<b>Session</b>	<b>09:00 - 16:00</b>	42 - 44, Aiolou Str., Monastiraki area (room 4, 2nd floor & room 6, 3rd floor)
<b>Thursday 26/04/2018</b>	<b>Session</b>	<b>09:00 - 16:00</b>	42 - 44, Aiolou Str., Monastiraki area (room 4, 2nd floor & room 6, 3rd floor)
<b>Friday 27/04/2018</b>	<b>Closing Ceremony</b>	<b>11:00 - 13:00</b>	42 - 44, Aiolou Str., Monastiraki area (room 4, 2nd floor)

## 2. Preparatory lectures' syllabus

Preparation of participants is crucial for achieving high-level performance and active involvement as well as to meet the simulation's goals. To this end, participants will have the opportunity to attend 3 preparatory lectures with total duration of 9 hours. The lectures will focus on the institutional processes, negotiating techniques and key aspects of the EU politics related with the "Athens EU model" agenda. During the preparatory lectures and based on the guidance of the tutor, students will be asked to prepare their position papers.

DATE	TUTOR	TOPIC	TIME	LOCATION
<b>Thursday 22/03/2018</b>	<b>Othon Kaminiaris IEIP Junior Research Fellow</b>	<b>The EU institutions and their role in the accession procedure</b>	<b>13:00 - 16:00</b>	42-44, Aiolou Str. Monastiraki area, 2nd floor, room 1
<b>Monday 26/03/2018</b>	<b>Associate Professor Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos</b>	<b>The interaction between domestic/regional politics and the process of European integration in the Western Balkans (Part I)</b>	<b>13:00 - 16:00</b>	42-44, Aiolou Str. Monastiraki area, 2nd floor, room 4
<b>Tuesday 27/03/2018</b>	<b>Associate Professor Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos</b>	<b>The interaction between domestic/regional politics and the process of European integration in the Western Balkans (Part II)</b>	<b>13:00 - 16:00</b>	42-44, Aiolou Str. Monastiraki area, 2nd floor, room 4
<b>Tuesday 10/04/2018</b>	<b>POSITION PAPERS SUBMISSION DEADLINE</b>		<b>23:59</b>	

### 2.2. Literature

Arolda Elbasani (2008), "EU enlargement in the Western Balkans: strategies of borrowing and inventing", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 10 (3), 293-307.

Börzel, Tanya A. and Risse, Thomas (2009), "The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas", *KFG Working Paper*, [http://www.polsoz.fu.berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working\\_paper/WP\\_01\\_Juni\\_Boerzel\\_Risse.pdf](http://www.polsoz.fu.berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/WP_01_Juni_Boerzel_Risse.pdf)

Cohen L. J. and J.R. Larrabee (2012), *Embracing Democracy in the Western Balkan: From Postconflict Struggles toward European Integration*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dabrowski, Marek and Yana Myachenkova (2018), "The Western Balkans on the road to the European Union", Bruegel Organization, *Policy Contribution*, issue no. 4, Brussels, February 2018, available at [http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PC-04\\_2018.pdf](http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PC-04_2018.pdf)

Elbassani, Arolda, ed., (2013), *European integration and transformation in the Western Balkans: Europeanization or business as usual ?*, Abington, Oxon.: Routledge.

Grabbe, Heather (2003), 'Europeanization goes east: power and uncertainty in the EU accession process', in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds) *The Politics of Europeanization*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp 303–31.

James Ker-Lindsay, Ioannis Armakolas, Rosa Balfour & Corina Stratulat (2018), "The National Politics of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans", *South East European and Black Sea Studies*, (17), 4, 511-522.

Noutcheva, Gergana (2012), *European Foreign Policy and the Challenges of Balkan Accession: Conditionality, Legitimacy and Compliance*, London: Routledge.

Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2005), *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

## 2.3. Position Paper Guidelines

A Position Paper is a brief summary of the position of a participant representing both his/her country and the role assigned to the simulation (especially for the participants of the European Commission). It should contain a clear position on the agenda item, clear reasoning, relevance, argumentation and viable suggestions concerning a plan of action on the issue under discussion.

The Position Paper should be an original and concise document based on the participant's endeavor and willingness to research effectively on the topic of the Agenda in order to participate efficiently during the debate procedure. Precisely, the position paper is divided into two parts; the first section addresses the general topic under discussion and its current developments, indicates the participant's foreign policy on the matter, presents the actions already been taken to tackle the problem, and refers to initiatives and strategies taken either by other European Union (EU) institutions or the international community as a whole. The second part is strictly offered to suggestions or proposals on the issue after having examined national reports or recommendations by international institutions. Additionally, the participants may refer to statements made by policy-makers, representatives of national/European/international institutions or by the government they are representing (mainly for the participants in the Council of the EU).

What is required is a clear depiction of the participant's policy and expectations from the upcoming debate. However, the Position Paper should not present in detail the negotiating positions since this will be portrayed during the sessions. Furthermore, the participants represent a single person and, thus, they are encouraged to make use of the perpendicular pronoun ('I'), while addressing the forum. All participants are asked to respect diplomatic courtesy and act in a polite manner throughout the conference, an element which should be depicted in the structure and redaction of their Position Paper. Finally, the Position Papers should not exceed one page.

### Sample Position Paper-Sexual and reproductive health and rights-The Netherlands

Throughout history, women have been forced into marriages, and forced to have children at an early age. These archaic acts must be punished by the government in every single country. It is not just a case of equality and justness, but a case of humanness as well. Furthermore, there is another pressing issue when it comes to discussing the right to reproductive and sexual health- access to contraception. We believe that the time for change has come. We believe that the biggest issue with teenage pregnancies is logistics, distribution, and, most of all, taboos that are embedded in our culture. We firmly believe that sexual education must be a very important part of the school curriculum and that government, and local authorities must make sure that everyone has access to contraception. It is true that the lack of contraceptive methods have already claimed too many lives.

All of us, both women and men are incredibly affected when our sexual and reproductive health rights are stepped on. In the time that has passed, 2 people have gotten HIV. These could be your partners in the future, or people dear to you. Men should be as worried and as committed to reproductive and sexual health as women. It is taking care of your partner, and the chauvinistic idea that women are the only ones who should be involved in family planning has got to be left to the past century. By educating women and giving them a voice and a choice as to how many children they want to have, and not forcing them into having unwanted sexual relations with you, your wives will be happier, have more time to actually earn money (and spend it), more time to educate your children, and, last, but not least: more time for you- more time to be pampered and taken care of.

I would like to finish by saying that this is an issue of life and death: if you don't have the chance to marry at an age of your choice and give birth to children at the age of your choice, your life (and the life of your family) is in danger. Most of all, it is a human development issue- we ought to have the ability to live the life that we choose to live, free of discrimination, abuse, and unnecessary suffering. Our sexual and reproductive health rights should be non-negotiable and equal for all.

### How to evaluate your research

- a.** Did you use a wide range of sources and references?
- b.** Can you prove the validity of your sources?
- c.** Does your evidence prove your claims and arguments?
- d.** Did you search adequately on the “opponents” stance towards the matter?
- e.** Did you put an emphasis on key words and specific aspects of the Agenda Item?
- f.** Did you make use of recent statistics to support your arguments efficiently?

### Tips to ameliorate your public speaking skills

- a.** Say what you want to say in a loud, clear and convincing voice.
- b.** Use notes to prepare your speech.
- c.** Trust yourself, take the time to breathe while talking, and make short pauses to help your audience understand the content of your speech, make adequate use of a semi-formal body language and keep your hands on the desk.
- d.** Be confident, take advantage of the role-playing and act as an expert to the topic under discussion.



# 3. Rules of procedure

The Project Supervisor of the Athens EU Model 2018, the Academic Board or the Board may at any point during the debate, suspend the application of the current Rules of Procedure and instruct alterations to facilitate the debate.

## i. Language

English is the only official and working language of the Council and the European Commission.

## ii. Role of the Board

The Presidents of the two fora (Council of the European Union and European Commission) will have sole and the final power to open and close sessions, recognize speakers, place limits on speaking time and control discussion and debate. While the Board is formally in charge of the proceedings and entitled to all courtesy and respect, they would usually “propose” and “suggest,” than “decree” and “dictate.”

The two Presidents, more than any other participant, are interested in a harmonious and consensual outcome of the conference. In cases where parliamentary procedure is unclear or in doubt, the Board shall use their judgment to settle the matter and proceed with the session. Main goal of the Board is to get different documents passed during the session and summarize into a final document at the end of the negotiations’ day. Note that the sessions will be chaired by the President of the Council of the European Union and the President of the European Commission, along with the assistance of the Secretaries-General and not a member state.

## iii. Delegations

- a.** Each member state will be represented by one participant and will irrespectively be afforded one vote. The participants are Ministers (Council of the European Union) or Commissioners (European Commission) of the member states of the European Union.
- b.** Participants are obliged to attend all sessions.
- c.** Participants are expected to have carefully read these rules of procedure, and to have thoroughly prepared for every session.
- d.** Participants are obliged to comply with the dress code as set by the EU Model Board of Directors during every official session. In case of non-compliance, the two Presidents has the right to take appropriate action. The accepted dress code for the Athens EU Model is formal attire.
- e.** Participants are expected to use courteous and respectful language towards the Board and their fellows.

## iv. Seating Arrangement

Ministers of the EU Member States (Council of EU Ministers) and Commissioners (European Commission) shall be seated in alphabetical order, based on the English name of the country. They will then each comment on the agenda and briefly present their country’s position.

## v. Quorum, Attendance and Roll Call

**a.** At the beginning of each session, the two Presidents will conduct a roll call to verify the quorum inside the forum. Participants shall state their presence in the assigned forum in either of the two following manners: i. Present and Voting: A participant that declares himself/herself “Present and voting” shall vote in favor or against any substantive matter without the possibility of abstention. ii. Present: A participant that declares himself/herself “Present” shall vote in favor, against or abstain on any substantive matter.

**b.** If participants arrive during or after the roll call, they are required to send a note to their President. As long as participants have not informed their President of their arrival, they will not be allowed to vote or deliver a speech. All participants who have not informed their President of their arrival until voting procedure begins are not eligible to vote.

**c.** Simple and two-thirds majority are defined by the roll call as this is taken at the beginning of every session and announced by the Presidents. The same applies for the number of countries necessary for the submission of a draft document and an amendment. Participants are requested to notify their President in case of an urgent need for abstention from the proceedings of their assigned forum in order to modify the respected numbers. In case majority numbers have changed, the two Presidents will announce the new numbers before any voting on a substantive matter.

**d.** Activities of the two fora shall start when at least one quarter (1/4) of the delegations are present, based on the final list of participants that will be provided to the two Presidents by the EU Model Board of Directors. If quorum is not met within fifteen (15) minutes after the scheduled starting time of the session, the two fora shall proceed with the number of delegations present irrespective of the number of participants present. Quorum shall be assumed when forum activities begin.

**e.** The two Presidents may at any time, and especially before entering voting procedures, revisit the quorum at their own discretion.

## vi. Assignment of Agenda Items / Setting the Agenda

Both the President of the Council of the European Union and the President of the European Commission have the right to propose the topic area that will be negotiated by the Ministers/Commissioners. The Agenda Item under discussion will be set automatically since in the Athens EU Model there is only one Topic Area.

## vii. Debate Format

The default debate mode used at the Athens EU Model will be a continuous informal debate. Informal debate will require participants wishing to speak to raise their placards and be recognized by the Board. It is the Board’s obligation to ensure and guide the flow of communication and to afford each participant an equal opportunity to speak. The Board keep track of the proceedings including the fair administration of the right to speak. The length of speaking time will be set by the Board. Participants make their statements while seated around the table. The Board, however, may comment on statements and express their view like all other participants. Participants may yield the remaining speaking time to a fellow member state by indicating so at the end of their speech or they can yield their time to questions. If not, the remaining time is yielded to the Board.

The normal running of the informal debate, may be interrupted by the conduction of an Unmoderated Caucus, which allows participants to leave their seats in order to talk more privately about their dispute

and settle it outside the public arena. During that time, Ministers and Commissioners should negotiate amongst themselves and write/edit working papers and final documents. The Board or any participant may call for an unmoderated caucus for a specified time and explain the reasoning behind the proposal. If all the participants second the motion, it will immediately be put to a vote. The Board will allow for no more than thirty minutes of informal debate within any given hour. Once informal debate time has elapsed, formal debate will resume.

### viii. Points and Motions

Participants may propose points which are questions or statements, and motions which are proposals. Motions are always subject to a “second” by participants and the Board decides so, they are brought to a vote immediately.

**Point of Order:** If, during a session, a participant feels that the procedure is running in a manner contrary to these Rules, he/she may rise to a point of order. The Board may overrule, or accept the appeal. If accepted, the Board may make an immediate ruling or ask the participant to speak on the point of order. The Board will then immediately rule on the point of order.

**Point of Parliamentary Inquiry:** If a participant wishes to obtain clarification of procedure or of any other matter, he/she may rise to a point of parliamentary inquiry and receive clarification from the Board or anyone else designated by the Board.

**Point of information:** The point of information can be addressed either to the Board or to another participant. The point of information to the Board pertains to a clarification on the content of the Agenda Item whereas the point of information to another participant comes as the result of the yielding to questions.

**Point of Personal Privilege:** A participant may rise to a point of personal privilege if his/her well-being inside the room is impaired. The Board shall immediately try to effectively address the issue. The point of personal privilege may not interrupt the speech and it should be used with the utmost discretion.

**Motion for a Moderated Caucus:** A participant may move for a Moderated Caucus thereby suggesting a change from general informal debate to moderated debate. A participant who moves for a Moderated Caucus must suggest a specific sub-topic for the Motion. The Board may also suggest a Moderated Caucus without possibility of appeal. If the Motion passes, the fora will enter a smaller debate inside the general debate whereby the Board will recognize participants who raise their placards to speak about the issue at hand. The moderated caucus may be extended

**Motion to Extend the Moderated Caucus:** A participant may move to extend the Moderated Caucus if they feel that additional time benefits forum’s work. The participant moving for an Extension of the Moderated Caucus must suggest a length for the extension, which shall not exceed the duration of the original Moderated Caucus. The Board may suggest a more appropriate caucus length or speaking time and put it to vote or may rule the Motion out of order without possibility of appeal.

**Motion for an Unmoderated Caucus:** A participant may move for an Unmoderated Caucus thereby suggesting a change from formal to informal debate. The participant who makes this motion must suggest a length and justification for the Unmoderated Caucus. The Board may suggest a more appropriate caucus length and put it to vote or may rule the Unmoderated Caucus out of order without possibility of appeal. Once the Motion has passed, the participants will carry an informal discussion on the topic specified in the Motion without leaving the conference room.

**Motion to Extend the Unmoderated Caucus:** A participant may move to extend the Unmoderated Caucus if they feel that additional time would benefit the work of the forum. The participant who moves for an Extension of Unmoderated Caucus must suggest a length for the extension, which shall not exceed the duration of the original Unmoderated Caucus. The Board may suggest a more appropriate caucus length and put it to vote or may rule the Extension of the Unmoderated Caucus out of order without the possibility of appeal.

**Motion for the Adjournment of the Meeting:** A participant may move for the Adjournment of the meeting to suspend all forum activities until the next scheduled meeting time. The Board may rule the Motion out of order without possibility of appeal or vote.

**Motion to Close Debate on a Draft Document:** A participant may move to Close Debate in order to end debate on a draft document, whereby the forum will enter voting procedure on all amendments on the floor. If the Board rules the Motion in order, there will be only two (2) participants speaking against the Motion. A two thirds (2/3) majority vote is required to pass the Motion to close debate.

**Motion for the Adjournment of the Session:** A participant may move for the Adjournment of the Session to suspend all forum activities for the duration of the conference. The Board may rule the Motion out of order without possibility of appeal or put it to an immediate vote. In the event that the Board approves this, there should be two (2) speakers in favor and two (2) speakers against the motion and the motion will require a 2/3 majority in favor to pass.

#### ix. Tour de Table

A mechanism known as a tour de table will also be used at the discretion of the Board. The Board will ask each Minister/Commissioner in turn to give a short summary (up to 2 minutes) of their thinking on the matter under discussion, thus ensuring that every participant is able to outline his/her position, and allowing the Board to determine whether a compromise is possible.

#### x. Working Papers

**a.** A working paper is an informal document used by the participant to work on building a draft document. It contains general ideas and proposals on the topic discussed and its purpose is to facilitate the proceedings by outlining a more concrete framework for discussion.

**b.** A working paper does not need to be written in the final document format and will be distributed at the President's discretion when requested by a participant.

**c.** A working paper does not need to be formally introduced. However, if its author wishes, he/she can ask from the Board the time to read it to the Forum. The Board will rule on this request without any possibility of appeal.

**d.** No maximum number of working papers that can be on the floor at the same time. The Board will give different numbers to the submitted working papers to avoid any possible confusion when referring to them.

#### xi. Draft Conclusions

**a.** When in general debate on the topic, the Board will ask the Ministers/Commissioners to prepare draft Conclusions, following the format in the respective guide. The drafts will be submitted to the Presidents, approved, signed and coded. The Presidents will then entertain a Motion to Introduce a Draft Conclusion, which is a procedural vote and requires a simple majority to pass. Before voting on the motion, the Presidents will have the Draft Conclusion distributed to their forum, and at their discretion, give one of the

sponsors of the Draft the opportunity to read it out. A vote will then be taken. Agreement with the motion to introduce the Draft Conclusion does not indicate agreement with its contents, but only expresses a wish to see it debated on the floor. If more than one draft has been submitted, the same procedure will be followed for all of them. The order in which the drafts are introduced is at the discretion of the two Presidents without any possibility of appeal.

**b.** Draft Conclusions can also be submitted to the two Presidents whilst debating other draft Conclusions.

**c.** Draft Conclusions that do not comply with the following guidelines will not be accepted:

**i.** The draft Conclusion has to follow a certain writing format.

**ii. Sponsors:** Each draft Conclusion has to be sponsored by at least ten percent of the countries present or present and voting. Sponsors are those countries that have prepared the draft Conclusion. A country that is sponsoring a draft Conclusion cannot sponsor another one on the same topic; however sponsors claim no ownership of the draft and bear no obligation to vote in favor of the draft when it is put into voting.

**iii. Signatories:** Each draft Conclusion has to be signed by at least ten percent of the countries present or present and voting in order to be eligible for introduction. Signatories are those countries who wish to see the respective draft being introduced. Signatories are at the same time neither considered as supporters of the draft nor bear any obligation towards the sponsors. A country can be a signatory to more than one draft Conclusion on the same topic.

**d.** If two or more draft Conclusions are complementary or fairly identical, the Board may request the sponsors of these drafts to combine them and re-submit them.

**e.** The sponsors of a Draft can request at any time to withdraw it from debate. If not all sponsors agree with the withdrawal of the draft, the sponsors who still wish for it to be introduced and voted upon will be given a reasonable amount of time from the Board to find new sponsors. If they do not manage to do so, the President will discuss with the remaining sponsors whether the draft will be introduced.

## xii. Amendments on a Draft Conclusion

**a.** When a Draft Resolution is on the floor, amendments can be introduced. Before introduction they require the approval of the Board. Upon gaining the Board's approval, one of the sponsors may make a Motion to Introduce an Amendment. This motion requires a second and if received it applies immediately without being put into vote. After the introduction of the amendment by the Sponsor, the Board will entertain two speakers in favor and two speakers against the amendment for forty-five (45) seconds each. After the speakers have taken the floor and concluded their speeches the amendment will be put into voting. Note that amendments to amendments are out of order but an amended part can be further amended.

**b.** Voting on an amendment is a procedural matter and a simple majority is required for passage.

**c.** If an amendment is accepted, the draft Conclusion will be changed accordingly.

**d.** Amendments that do not comply with the following guidelines will not be accepted:

**i. Writing Format:** Amendments have to clearly define their scope and purpose.

**ii. Sponsors:** Each amendment needs to be sponsored by at least one-eighth (1/8) of the countries present or present and voting in order to be submitted.



e. If all sponsors of the draft document have signed and/or approved an amendment, then this action is considered a friendly amendment. A friendly amendment is automatically incorporated into the draft document. Amendments that do not have the support of all sponsors of the draft document are deemed unfriendly, and require the standard procedure. A friendly amendment can be further amended via the unfriendly amendment process.

f. Grammatical, spelling or formatting errors on a draft Conclusion will be corrected at the discretion of the two Presidents.

g. The sponsors of an amendment can request at any time to withdraw it from the floor.

### xiii. Voting Procedures

In the European Commission, each participant has to cast only one vote during the final voting procedure on a Draft Communication in order to reach a consensus through a unanimous vote

In the Council of the European Union, decision on the Draft Directive is taken by qualified majority or else a 'double majority' rule, corresponding 55% of member states (16 out of 28), representing at least 65% of the EU population (currently approximately 335.4 million out of a total 516 million). In order for a blocking minority to be formed, a block of states must include at least 4 Council members, representing more than 35% of the EU population (approximately 180 million).

When the Council votes on a proposal not made by the Commission or the High Representative, a decision is adopted if there are 72 % of EU country votes in favour and they represent at least 65 % of the EU population. In cases where not all Member States participate in voting (e.g. acts adopted only by euro area or Schengen Member States, or within enhanced cooperation), the qualified majority is calculated only on the basis of the participating Member States.

a. Where votes are taken, they should normally be open and made by roll call in alphabetical order, according to the country name of the Ministers and Commissioners, and recorded by the Board. The Board will be the last called to vote. Voting will be verbal and expressed either as "Yes" or "No". Any member can abstain at any time during voting procedures. Once the voting procedure has been declared open, no one will be allowed to speak other than to cast his or her vote. No participant may approach or leave the room. Once all votes have been cast, the Board will count the votes and immediately announce the result. The decisions of the Board on the announcement will be final.

b. The following stipulations apply during the voting procedure: First a participant has to put in a motion to close the debate. This means that debates on the substantive issue stop and the forum moves into a voting procedure. In voting procedure participants have the opportunity to reorder the draft conclusions via a motion to reorder. If the Board does not want to change the order there is a possibility for a participant to put forward a motion to divide the question or a motion for a roll call vote. If no motion to divide the question or for a roll call vote is introduced the voting will be done by the participants raising their placards.

**i. Motion to Reorder the Draft Conclusions:** In the event that there are multiple Draft Conclusions on the floor, the forum will vote by default on Draft Conclusions in chronological order, i.e. the Draft Conclusion introduced first will be voted on first. Only in the event that the first Draft Conclusion fails, the forum will move on the second and so forth. A participant may request to vote on the Draft Conclusions in a different order. This motion requires a simple majority to pass.

**ii. Motion to Divide the Question:** Prior to the start of the voting process on a Draft Conclusion, a participant may request a Motion to Divide the Question to vote on an individual or group of operative clauses. A participant must specify how he/she wishes to divide the operative clauses during his/her motion. Should there be more than one motion to divide the question on the floor, the forum shall vote first on the one that suggests the most radical division and continue in this descending pattern. The Board shall recognize two Speakers in favor and two Speakers against the first motion to divide the question for a speaking time of thirty seconds each. A simple majority is required to pass the motion. If the motion passes, subsequent motions to Divide the Question will be ruled dilatory and the forum will proceed to vote on the draft Conclusion in the manner suggested in the motion. If the motion fails, the remaining motions made will be considered in accordance with the above procedure. The divided section that fails during voting will be taken out of the final draft Conclusion; only those sections that have been passed shall remain. The forum will then proceed to vote upon the new final draft Conclusion as a whole after all the divisions have been voted on. If all operative clauses fail, the draft Conclusion, as a whole, fails.

**iii. Motion for a Roll Call Vote:** Roll Call Voting is only in order for voting a draft Conclusion as a whole and not for voting on clauses if division of the question exists. If this motion is made it is not put into voting and it only requires to be seconded in order for it to pass. It is at the discretion of the two Presidents to accept the motion with no possibility of appeal. If the motion is accepted the two Presidents will ask the Ministers/Commissioners to cast their vote in alphabetical order starting from a random country. The Board will place the Delegation that passed at the bottom of the voting list. A Delegation that has passed once during a voting sequence may not pass again but must vote definitively.

**iv. Voting with Rights:** A participant may request a right of explanation after voting. Voting with Rights is only in order when voting is held with a Roll Call Vote.

**c.** No participant may vote on behalf of another participant.

**d.** The Fora can pass only one Conclusion for the topic on the agenda.

**e.** Once a Draft Conclusion passes, the drafts that have not yet been voted on fail immediately.

**f.** During voting procedure on substantive matters, the doors of the forum close and no one is allowed in or out of the room apart from members of the Secretariat.

**g.** Note passing is not allowed during voting procedures.

#### xiv. Closure of Debate

The Board will normally decide on the closure of a debate, but a participant may move for closure, and (if necessary) be given a maximum of one minute to explain his/her rationale. If at least two other participants second the motion, it will immediately be put to a vote and requires the support of at least a simple majority to be successful. The Board will declare the debate closed if the vote is successful.

#### xv. Judging and Awards

The members of the presidency along with the Academic Board of the Institute and the Organizing Team of the Athens EU Model will be involved in the judging deliberations. Participants are evaluated on their preparedness, accurate representation of country position, and use of diplomacy including correct use of parliamentary procedure, negotiating skill, and ability to make compromises.

## 4. Study guides

### **Topic:** “EU accession negotiations of Balkan states”

#### 4.1. Institutional Framework

##### 4.1.1. The European Commission

The European Commission, the institution of the EU usually referred to as the “guardian of the Treaties”, body of 28 Commissioners appointed for a mandate of five years. The College of Commissioners consists of one President, seven Vice – Presidents, including the High-Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and twenty Commissioners, in charge of a specific policy area portfolio. The President is elected by the European Parliament (hereinafter as “EU Parliament”) after the relative proposal has been put forward by the European Council. The latter decides by qualified majority and taking into account the results of the European Parliament elections. Once elected, the President makes a proposal to the Council for the appointment of the twenty seven members of his/her College, corresponding to the different Member-States upon suggestion by the latter. The Council, “by common accord with the President-elect, shall adopt the list of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as members of the Commission” (article 17). In order to assume office, the body as a whole is approved by the European Parliament, following an assessment of the candidates by the Parliament’s committees.

The institutional role of the European Commission includes:

- i.** the preparation of the legislative proposals for the EU secondary law, which are then adopted by the co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers
- ii.** the application and the enforcement of the EU law
- iii.** the definition and the accomplishment of the objectives and priorities for action within the EU, as they are outlined in the yearly Commission Work Programme
- iv.** the implementation of the EU policies and the EU budget
- v.** the representation of the EU in its foreign relations.

##### 4.1.2. Decision making process

The Council of the European Union, casually referred as Consilium, is the intergovernmental pillar of EU institutional apparatus. It is responsible for the negotiation and adoption of new EU legislation, the adaptation of the current one and the coordination of the EU policies. In a variety of cases the Council of Ministers decides along with the European Parliament through the ordinary legislative procedure, which is also known as «co-decision». The co-decision was first introduced in 1992, and its use was extended in 1999. After the Lisbon Treaty, the co-decision became the fundamental decision-making process in legislative issues. The aforementioned procedure is common in policy areas where the EU has exclusive competence or it shares it with the member states and as a result the Consilium legislates based on certain proposals of the European Commission. Often the Council indicates earlier to the Commission that it would welcome a draft on a specific subject, and then the European Parliament acts as the co-legislator along with the Council. The policy outcome depends upon the interaction between the three institutions.

In specific areas, though, the Council takes decisions using special legislative procedures. Those are the consent procedure, in which the Parliament can accept or reject a legislative proposal by an absolute majority vote, but cannot amend it. The consultation procedure falls in the same category, where the role of the Parliament is limited and may approve, reject or propose amendments to a legislative proposal. This



procedure is described in Article 289(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union<sup>1</sup> (TFEU).

When the proposal of the European Commission is received by the Consilium, the 'reading' procedure begins and the draft document is thoroughly and meticulously examined-at the same time-by both the European Parliament and the Consilium. There are times when the Consilium-in order to speed up the legislative procedure and facilitate the agreement between the two institutions-moves towards the adoption of a 'general approach' offering to the European Parliament a hint pertaining to the Consilium's stance on the matter discussed and negotiated upon. However, the Consilium shall wait the Parliament's first reading opinion to reach a final position. Throughout the 'reading' phase the proposal passes by the working party (there are more than 150 parties and committees), the Permanent Representatives Committee (ambassadors' level) and the Consilium as a whole. Therefore, technical scrutiny and political responsibility is achieved.

On the phase of Consilium configuration, there is either the listing of the item as 'A'-when the Permanent Representatives Committee has finalized the discussions of the proposal and decision will come without any debate-or the categorization as 'B' section of the Agenda when the proposal includes sensitive political matters and as a result no decision has been reached in the previous levels. When the Consilium acts as a legislator, the votes of its Member States are made public. Sometimes, a Member State may wish to add a note to explain its vote, which is also made public in case a legal act is adopted.

#### 4.1.3. Ordinary legislative procedure

According to Articles 289 and 294 of the TFEU, the co-decision process was renamed to ordinary legislative procedure and became the main decision-making procedure for adopting EU legislation; it applies to around 85 policy areas as well as to environmental issues. It has to be noted that most of the EU legal acts that are negotiated through this procedure, pass at the first 'reading'. This procedure includes two main legislators, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, whereas the European Commission retains the right of the legislative initiative.

This procedure consists of four key-points that include:

1. The submission of a proposal by the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
2. Either at the first, or at the second reading the Council and the Parliament adopt a legislative proposal<sup>2</sup>.
3. In case the two institutions do not reach common ground, after the second reading a conciliation committee is convened.
4. The legislative act is adopted, if the text agreed by the conciliation committee is acceptable by both the Council and the Parliament in the third reading.

In case the legislative proposal of the European Commission is rejected, or the other two institutions cannot agree, the proposal is not adopted and the negotiation ends.

To present it briefly, the procedure follows the steps you can find below:

Legislative Proposal—First Reading—Second Reading—Conciliation—Third Reading

#### 4.1.4. Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union-the third of the seven institutions of the EU as listed in the Treaty on European Union- is one of the main decision making and legislative bodies of the European Union. The

<sup>1</sup>"Special legislative procedures: at a glance", Council of the European Union, 24 September 2014, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/special-legislative-procedures/>, read on 3 March 2016

<sup>2</sup>"The ordinary legislative procedure", Council of the European Union, 2 February 2016, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/ordinary-legislative-procedure/>, read on 3 March 2016

Council is an intergovernmental body expressing the interest of the member-states and representing the member governments. It is the institution where national ministers from each EU country meet to adopt laws and coordinate policies in various fields, such as economic and fiscal policies, education and culture and employment policy. It exercises its powers and activities with the cooperation of the European Parliament and coordinates or defines the strategy and policy of the member-states of the European Union in every sector. Moreover, it develops the EU's common foreign and security policy, based on guidelines set by the European Council, and along with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, it reassures the effectiveness and success of the EU's external action. It also concludes international agreements, based on a proposal from the Commission, and adopts the final decision for the closure of the negotiations on an agreement, after the Parliament has consented and the Member States have ratified it. Finally, another responsibility of the Council is the adoption of the yearly EU budget along with the European Parliament.

The Council of the EU is both an institution with collective EU functions and the creature of member governments<sup>3</sup>. Its members are Ministers from the governments of the member-states, and which Ministers attend the scheduled meetings depends on the agenda item. The Council is in law a single entity, irrespective of which Ministers take part in it. As of autumn 2009 the Council meets in 10 configurations.

It is located in the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels, Belgium, with the exception of the months of April, June and October during which its sessions are held in Luxembourg. The Ministers who are authorized to participate in the sessions depend on the topic; for example, when discussing environmental policy the Council is formed by the 28 national ministers whose portfolio includes this policy area (with the related European Commissioners contributing but not having the right to vote).<sup>4</sup>

The Council has a rotating presidency which shifts among the EU member-states every six months. The Presidency prepares the agendas and is responsible for the conduct of the meetings. To achieve a continuity in the Council's work, the Lisbon Treaty has initiated the method of 'trios'; a system that prepares an agenda with an 18-month vision and requires from each of the three countries to prepare its own program of action. The Presidency plans and chairs meetings in the Council and its preparatory bodies and also acts as the representative of the Council to the other EU institutions, working closely with the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The General Secretariat of the Council is assisting the European Council and the Council of the European Union, ensuring the coherence inside the Council. The Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union is the Head of the Secretariat. Often the Council and the Commission have to work closely together to reconcile policy powers between the EU and the national levels.

The Council of the EU votes either by unanimity or by qualified majority (QMV) under which each member-state has a fixed (weighted) number of votes and needs the agreement of the 55% of the member-states a sum representing the 65% of the EU population. In policy areas where it operates unanimously it only needs the consultation of the European Parliament. The weighting of votes roughly reflects the size of population of each member-state. The total number of votes is 354 and a minimum of 255 votes is required for a decision to be adopted. Simple majority is used for non-legislative issues and requires 15 out of the 28 votes for an issue to be accepted. The Council may move to voting procedures on a legislative act 8 weeks after the draft act has been submitted to national parliaments for their examination and compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, in urgent cases, though, we might have an earlier voting. The

<sup>3</sup>Wallace 2000, p.16

<sup>4</sup>Avrami L. & Chatzistavrou F. (2013) "Guide: The Greek Parliament and the EU", Athens: Representation of the European Commission (in greek) [Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/greece/news/2014/20140219\\_odigos\\_elliniko\\_koinovoulia\\_ee\\_el.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/greece/news/2014/20140219_odigos_elliniko_koinovoulia_ee_el.htm)]

President of the Council of the European Union initiates the voting procedure.

The Council of Ministers should not be confused neither with the European Council nor with the Council of Europe. The European Council brings together the heads of member-states or governments and it is responsible for setting the general political guidelines. The Council of Europe is a regional intergovernmental organization completely separate from the EU, set up in 1949 with the aim of promoting democracy, human rights, democracy and the rule of law within 28 member-states<sup>5</sup>. The main difference between the Council of Europe and the European Union is that the former cannot legislate.

Policy-making in the European Union is considered a complex process as institutions are in flux, authority is sometimes contested and multiple levels of governance engage a variety of actors. To facilitate our understanding, we depict policy-making through a cycle that includes agenda-setting when an issue becomes important, policy formulation as the phase where specific proposals are presented, policy decision when a course of action is chosen, implementation of the policy and last but not least evaluation in order for a policy to be continuous, durable and ever-changing for the acquisition of better results.

#### 4.1.5. Decision making process in the Council

The Council of the European Union, casually referred as Consilium, is the intergovernmental pillar of EU institutional apparatus. It is responsible for the negotiation and adoption of new EU legislation, the adaptation of the current one and the coordination of the EU policies. In a variety of cases the Council of Ministers decides along with the European Parliament through the ordinary legislative procedure, which is also known as «co-decision». The co-decision was first introduced in 1992, and its use was extended in 1999. After the Lisbon Treaty, the co-decision became the fundamental decision-making process in legislative issues. The aforementioned procedure is common in policy areas where the EU has exclusive competence or it shares it with the member states and as a result the Consilium legislates based on certain proposals of the European Commission. Often the Council indicates earlier to the Commission that it would welcome a draft on a specific subject, and then the European Parliament acts as the co-legislator along with the Council. The policy outcome depends upon the interaction between the three institutions.

In specific areas, though, the Council takes decisions using special legislative procedures. Those are the consent procedure, in which the Parliament can accept or reject a legislative proposal by an absolute majority vote, but cannot amend it. The consultation procedure falls in the same category, where the role of the Parliament is limited and may approve, reject or propose amendments to a legislative proposal. This procedure is described in Article 289(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union<sup>6</sup> (TFEU). When the proposal of the European Commission is received by the Consilium, the 'reading' procedure begins and the draft document is thoroughly and meticulously examined-at the same time-by both the European Parliament and the Consilium. There are times when the Consilium-in order to speed up the legislative procedure and facilitate the agreement between the two institutions-moves towards the adoption of a 'general approach' offering to the European Parliament a hint pertaining to the Consilium's stance on the matter discussed and negotiated upon. However, the Consilium shall wait the Parliament's first reading opinion to reach a final position. Throughout the 'reading' phase the proposal passes by the working party (there are more than 150 parties and committees), the Permanent Representatives Committee (ambassadors' level) and the Consilium as a whole. Therefore, technical scrutiny and political responsibility is achieved.

<sup>5</sup> "Voting system, how does the Council vote?", Council of the European Union, 4 November 2015, retrieved from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/>, read on 3 March 2016

<sup>6</sup> "Special legislative procedures: at a glance", Council of the European Union, 24 September 2014, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/special-legislative-procedures/>, read on 3 March 2016

On the phase of Consilium configuration, there is either the listing of the item as 'A'-when the Permanent Representatives Committee has finalized the discussions of the proposal and decision will come without any debate-or the categorization as 'B' section of the Agenda when the proposal includes sensitive political matters and as a result no decision has been reached in the previous levels. When the Consilium acts as a legislator, the votes of its Member States are made public. Sometimes, a Member State may wish to add a note to explain its vote, which is also made public in case a legal act is adopted.

#### 4.1.6. Ordinary legislative procedure

According to Articles 289 and 294 of the TFEU, the co-decision process was renamed to ordinary legislative procedure and became the main decision-making procedure for adopting EU legislation; it applies to around 85 policy areas as well as to environmental issues. It has to be noted that most of the EU legal acts that are negotiated through this procedure, pass at the first 'reading'. This procedure includes two main legislators, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, whereas the European Commission retains the right of the legislative initiative.

This procedure consists of four key-points that include:

1. The submission of a proposal by the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
2. Either at the first, or at the second reading the Council and the Parliament adopt a legislative proposal.
3. In case the two institutions do not reach common ground, after the second reading a conciliation committee is convened.
4. The legislative act is adopted, if the text agreed by the conciliation committee is acceptable by both the Council and the Parliament in the third reading.

In case the legislative proposal of the European Commission is rejected, or the other two institutions cannot agree, the proposal is not adopted and the negotiation ends.

To present it briefly, the procedure follows the steps you can find below:

Legislative Proposal—First Reading—Second Reading—Conciliation—Third Reading

## 4.2 EU Accession Procedure

### 4.2.1. Articles 2 & 49 of the Treaty on EU

According to **Article 2** of the Treaty on EU, which sets the EU's values, “[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”<sup>35</sup>.

**Article 49** of the Treaty on EU establishes the conditions of eligibility to apply for EU membership and the procedure for becoming a member<sup>36</sup>. Hence, “[a]ny European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account”<sup>37</sup>. The second paragraph of the article, writes as follows: “[t]he conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”<sup>38</sup>.

### 4.2.2. Accession (Copenhagen) Criteria

The Accession Criteria or, otherwise, Copenhagen criteria, named after the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, which defined them, and later strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995, consist the conditions with which all states need to comply, in order to attain membership. There is a political criterion, an economic and an administrative-institutional one. Respectively, they are:

1. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
2. a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
3. ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the ‘acquis’), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

For EU accession negotiations to be launched, a country must satisfy the first criterion.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C115, Volume 51, 9 May 2008, p. C115/17

<sup>36</sup> “EU Accession Procedure”, Library Briefing 26/03/13, Library of the European Parliament, p. 2: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130437/LDM\\_BRI\(2013\)130437\\_REV3\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130437/LDM_BRI(2013)130437_REV3_EN.pdf) (13/02/18)

<sup>37</sup> Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, *op. cit.*, p. C115/43

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>39</sup> EUR-Lex, 2018: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession\\_criteria\\_copenhagen.html](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhagen.html) (13/02/18)



### 4.2.3. Absorption capacity and enlargement fatigue

Apart from the aforementioned conditions, which concern the states applying for membership, there is also a criterion concerning the EU itself and the enlargement process. Specifically, it refers to the EU's ability to absorb new members. Originally, this criterion was also set in Copenhagen, back in 1993, as the *"the Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of integration"*<sup>40</sup>. The concept became more official, after the publication of the 2005 "Enlargement Strategy Paper of the European Commission", which defined it as the EU's *"capacity to act and decide according to a fair balance within institutions; respect budgetary limits and implement common policies that function well and achieve their objectives"*<sup>41</sup>. In 2006, after the "big bang enlargement" and the inclusion of ten new member-states, the absorption capacity was recalled, as the need for the protection of the EU's cohesion and effectiveness: in accordance with the criteria concerning the new members, the Union itself must be able to function politically, financially and institutionally, as it enlarges<sup>42</sup>. Later in that year, the then Commissioner for enlargement Olli Rehn, in a speech of his welcomed the change of the term from absorption to integration capacity<sup>43</sup>.

That change, actually, was a result of the publication of another document, a Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, under the title "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007, Including annexed the special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members". The new term was *"about whether the EU can take in new members at a given moment or in a given period, without jeopardizing the political and policy objectives established by the Treaties"*<sup>44</sup> and it was based on three components, an institutional, a budgetary and a political. The Communication referred that the EU:

- needs to ensure that its institutions and decision-making processes remain effective and accountable, for the sake of current member states as well as in view of further enlargement.
- needs to be in a position, as it enlarges, to continue developing and implementing common policies in all areas. Assessment of the impact of enlargement on EU policies will take place at all key stages of the enlargement process.
- before any further accession, the EU will need to decide on the overall budgetary means required...The Commission's analysis will take account both of the budgetary aspects and of the increased economic dynamism generated by accessions.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Emerson M. et al., "Just what is this 'absorption capacity' of the European Union?", CEPS policy brief, No. 113, September 2006, p. 1

<sup>41</sup> Commission of the European Communities, 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, Brussels, 9.11.2005, p. 3

<sup>42</sup> Emerson M. et al., *op. cit.*, p. 1

<sup>43</sup> European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (a): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-06-797\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-06-797_en.htm) (05/03/2018)

<sup>44</sup> Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007, Including annexed the special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members, Brussels, 8.11.2006, p. 17

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p. 20-21

Nowadays, the integration capacity has received a dual meaning, the ability of the EU to prepare non-members for membership (external integration capacity) and to preserve its functioning and cohesion once they join (internal integration capacity)<sup>46</sup>. Nonetheless, the emphasis remains on the latter, as the said capacity of the Union is intertwined with another notion linked with the internal function of the EU, that of the “enlargement fatigue”. This second term was coined in the early 2000s, in order to describe frustration with the difficulty of institutional reforms and the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, as well as misgivings about the candidates<sup>47</sup>. It gradually grew to mean simply unwillingness to grant the EU membership to new states<sup>48</sup> for numerous reasons, depending on the state in question, but has since been used as scapegoat for a range of deeper problems and stumbling blocks in the EU<sup>49</sup>. Thus, it is an ever-present term in the enlargement discourse, recently used even by the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, during his visit to all six Western Balkan countries in late February-early March 2018<sup>50</sup>.

#### 4.2.4. *Acquis Communautaire*

In order for the accession negotiations to start, the candidate country needs to have adopted and implemented the *acquis*, the body of common rights and obligations binding on all member states. It is constantly evolving and comprises:

1. the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties;
2. legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice;
3. declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union;
4. instruments under the Common Foreign and Security Policy;
5. international agreements concluded by the Union and those entered into by the member states among themselves within the sphere of the Union’s activities.<sup>51</sup>

Today, the *acquis* consists of 35 chapters, on the basis of which the accession negotiations with each candidate state happen, as the membership cannot be attained, before an alignment with the chapters has been achieved. The chapters are the following<sup>52</sup>:

<sup>46</sup>Börzel T. A., Dimitrova A. and Schimmelfennig F., “European Union enlargement and integration capacity: concepts, findings, and policy implications”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 24, Issue 2, p. 157–176, p. 158

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p. 159-160


<sup>48</sup>Szolucha A., “The EU and Enlargement Fatigue: Why has the European Union not been able to counter enlargement fatigue?”, *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, Volume 6, Issue 1, p. 1-16, p. 1 ml (13/02/18)

<sup>49</sup>Balfour R. and Stratulat C., “The enlargement of the European Union”, *European Policy Center Discussion Paper*, 10 December 2012, p. 2

<sup>50</sup> Euronews, 2018: <http://www.euronews.com/2018/03/02/jean-claude-juncker-and-eu-enlargement-fatigue> (05/03/2018)

<sup>51</sup>European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations*, 2018 (a): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>52</sup>European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations*, 2018 (b): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis_en) (13/02/2018)



Chapter 1: Free movement of goods  
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers  
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services  
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital  
Chapter 5: Public procurement  
Chapter 6: Company law  
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law  
Chapter 8: Competition policy  
Chapter 9: Financial services  
Chapter 10: Information society and media  
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development  
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy  
Chapter 13: Fisheries  
Chapter 14: Transport policy  
Chapter 15: Energy  
Chapter 16: Taxation  
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy  
Chapter 18: Statistics  
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment  
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy  
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks  
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments  
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights  
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security  
Chapter 25: Science and research  
Chapter 26: Education and culture  
Chapter 27: Environment  
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection  
Chapter 29: Customs union  
Chapter 30: External relations  
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy  
Chapter 32: Financial control  
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions  
Chapter 34 - Institutions  
Chapter 35 - Other issues



#### 4.2.5. Steps towards joining <sup>53</sup>

##### 1. Membership application

After the country willing to enter EU has submitted formal applications in accordance to article 49 of the TEU, it becomes an official candidate acknowledged by the Council, following the Commission's opinion. This marks the accession procedure, but not the opening of the negotiations.

##### 2. Formal membership negotiations

After the Commission has decided upon the country's alignment with the Copenhagen criteria (essential but not formally required), the negotiations open with a unanimous vote of the Council. The negotiations are held between ministers, ambassadors of the EU and the candidate country in the form of an intergovernmental conference.

The most essential procedure is what is called "screening", realised by the Commission. It consists a detailed examination of each chapter in order to determine how well a country is prepared. The findings are presented on a screening report, presented to all member states. This report ends to either the direct open of the negotiations, or an opening under certain conditions, which are called opening benchmarks <sup>54</sup>.

In addition, before negotiations can start, it is necessary for the country to submit its position, and the EU will agree upon a common position concerning each chapter separately. Before the closure of negotiations, the EU sets some closing benchmarks that need to be reached by the candidate country in certain policy domains. The duration of negotiations upon each chapter may vary due to different parameters concerning the alignment with the *acquis*. Furthermore, the need for a unanimous vote on every chapter may also delay or pose indefinitely the procedure. The chapters cannot be closed until every member-state is satisfied with the country's policy in compliance with the *acquis*. The negotiation process can be closed, only if every individual chapter has been closed too.

After the negotiation has been closed, the accession is ratified by an agreement, known as "Accession Treaty". This treaty contains the terms and conditions of membership, transitional and financial arrangements, safeguard clauses and deadlines. The treaty though, is not binding until it has the full support of the EU Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. Moreover, it needs to be signed by the candidate country and the representatives of all the other EU members-states, and ratified according to the constitutional laws of each one of them <sup>55</sup>. From the signature of the treaty, until the date prescript on it, the country is considered as an "Accessing Country". In the interim, it benefits from special arrangements such as commenting on draft EU proposals, communications, recommendations or initiatives and "active observer status" on EU bodies and agencies, meaning that they are eligible to speak, but not to vote.

<sup>53</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (c), [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>54</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (d), [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/screening\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/screening_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>55</sup> "EU Accession Procedure", *op. cit.*, p. 3

## 4.3. The role of the Commission in the Accession Procedure

### 4.3.1. Role during negotiations

During the pre-accession procedure the Commission checks if the country complies with the *acquis*, and may offer a pre-accession funding, in order to aid it fulfil its commitments towards the Union. The process of joining the EU (accession) broadly consists of 3 stages:

Firstly, when a country is ready, it becomes an official candidate for membership – but this does not necessarily mean that formal negotiations have been opened. Secondly, the candidate moves on to formal membership negotiations, a process that involves the adoption of established EU law, preparations for it to properly apply and enforce it and implementation of judicial, administrative, economic and other reforms, necessary for the country to meet the conditions for joining, known as accession criteria. Lastly, when the negotiations and accompanying reforms have been completed to the satisfaction of both sides, the country can join the EU.

Membership negotiations cannot start until all EU governments agree, in the form of a unanimous decision by the EU Council, on a framework or mandate for negotiations with the candidate country. Negotiations take place between ministers and ambassadors of the EU governments and the candidate country in what is called an intergovernmental conference <sup>56</sup>.

### 4.3.2. Screening

Negotiations under each chapter are based on the following elements:

**Screening:** the Commission, along with the candidate country, carries out a detailed examination of each policy field, in order to determine the level of preparedness of the country in question. The by chapter findings are presented by the Commission to the member-states in the form of a screening report. The conclusion of this report is a recommendation of the Commission to either open negotiations directly or to require that certain conditions (the opening benchmarks) should first be met.

**Negotiating positions:** before negotiations can start, the candidate country must submit its position and the EU must adopt a common position. For most chapters the EU will set closing benchmarks in this position which need to be met by the Candidate Country before negotiations in the policy field concerned can be closed. The Commission is proposing that in the future these chapters would be opened on the basis of action plans, with interim benchmarks to be met based on their implementation before closing benchmarks are set <sup>57</sup>.

### 4.3.3. The evolution of the European Commission's positions

While the European Commission has always been in favour of enlargement, sometimes throughout the years, it seemed hard to cooperate or unlikely to settle. Why this happened, and why at some point the negotiations stopped, depended on different issues, mainly concerning the economic and political situation that both the Union and the candidate states faced.

<sup>56</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (e): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-negotiations\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-negotiations_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>57</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement, 2018 (d), *op. cit.*

As Olli Rehn stated in 2009, *“if the 20th century taught us anything, it is the folly of complacency when it comes to the Western Balkans. There is no end of history in sight, nor irreversible stability, at least not quite yet. All these arguments – the gains from enlargement and the risks of wavering – underline why we must maintain the European perspective in South East Europe, with the ultimate goal of EU membership once the conditions have been met by each country on its own merits”*<sup>58</sup>. Based on that, enlargement process is a strong card as far as the Union’s power is concerned.

Back in 2011, according to Mr. Fóle, the then European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, the Union was positive in welcoming Serbia, since, sooner or later, it could comply with all the demands. The year 2011 seemed to be to become one of enlargement momentum, with the states seeming to be on the right track, regarding the fulfilment of their commitments. Nevertheless, the main argument of Commissioner Fóle expressed in the Western Balkan Forum in Luxemburg was that only *“fulfilment brings results”*. So, the candidates had to convince both the Commission and Member States that they were ready to move to the next stage in the process<sup>59</sup>.

In the 2012-2013 Enlargement Strategy Paper, two key elements were underlined: the importance of further associating the enlargement countries to the strengthening of the European Union’s economic governance, as well as implementing measures to support economic recovery<sup>60</sup>.

In March 2013, the Union was ready to welcome Croatia. During that time, concerns among the EU citizens were expressed, due to the global economic crisis, and enlargement was at that point considered as something unnecessary. However, the Commission had stated that enlargement is not part of the issue but a way to get away from it: *“Enlargement is promoting economic and financial stability and supporting increased trade and business opportunities in the aspiring countries, between them and between them and us. Through our inter-connected economies, this translates into a shared interest in more growth and jobs”*, had underlined Commissioner Fóle<sup>61</sup>. During the same year, the enlargement progress was more than satisfying : Croatia did become a member and negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia were advancing well. Kosovo had already started negotiations about applying the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and confidence had been restored inside the Union.

The reasons why EU aimed in enlargement at that point had mainly to do with the needs for a greater market, and, hence, greater scope for economies of scale, easier access to new resources and greater opportunities. Second, since its inception, it has responded to the legitimate aspiration of the peoples of the European continent to be united in a common European endeavour. Third, at a time when the Union faced major challenges and significant global uncertainty, enlargement policy continued to contribute to peace, security and prosperity on the continent. At the same time, by incorporating the Western Balkans, Turkey and Ireland, the Union would increase its population by 20%. With the emergence of the so-called “BRICS” countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the Asia-Pacific region, Europe and

<sup>58</sup> European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (b): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-09-245\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-245_en.htm) (13/02/18)

<sup>59</sup> European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (c): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-11-463\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-463_en.htm) (13/02/18)

<sup>60</sup> European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, Brussels, 10.10.2012, p. 10

<sup>61</sup> European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (d): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-13-195\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-195_en.htm) (13/02/18)

the North Atlantic would no longer be the only dominant global players. Hence, size seemed to be a major factor, as far as world influence was concerned.<sup>62</sup>

Against this positive will for integration, a year later, President Juncker, after assuming his duties, announced the halt of the enlargement procedure: *“There will be no new enlargement in the next five years”* Juncker had stated, because, *“the EU needs to mark a pause in its enlargement process so that we can consolidate what has been done with 28”*<sup>63</sup>. Those statements were somewhat recanted in 2017, when, in “The State of the Union”, President Juncker declared that the economy was recovering in the EU, after 10 years of absence. *“The wind is back in Europe’s sails. We now have a window of opportunity but it will not stay open forever. Let us make the most of the momentum, catch the wind in our sails”*<sup>64</sup>, the President stated. Could this phrase be summarizing a change towards a direction of welcoming new members and building a stronger, more democratic Europe by 2025?

He was true, saying that during the mandate of the present Commission and Parliament (lasting until 2019), there would be no enlargement, as no candidate would be ready. However, *“thereafter the European Union will be greater than 27 in number”*, President Juncker had stated. *“If we want more stability in our neighbourhood, then we must maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans”, but “[a]ccession candidates must give the rule of law, justice and fundamental rights utmost priority in the negotiations”*<sup>65</sup>. The Union seems to be launching a diplomatic effort to accelerate steps to bring six countries in the Western Balkans into the EU fold after years of stop-start progress. The European Commissioner on European Neighbourhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, while referring to the EU’s eastward expansion said that *“[w]e have set 2025 as an indicative date for Serbia and Montenegro, which is realistic but also very ambitious”*<sup>66</sup>. In any case, should be born in mind that the President of the Commission explicitly said that even *“2025 is an indication, not a promise” for a possible accession of the Western Balkan countries, as “all the conditions and criteria...have to be fulfilled”* first<sup>67</sup>.

<sup>62</sup> European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (e): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-13-735\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-735_en.htm) (13/02/18)

<sup>63</sup> EU Business 2018: <https://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/politics-juncker.x29> (13/02/18)

<sup>64</sup> European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (f): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-17-3165\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm) (13/02/18)

<sup>65</sup> European Commission, Western Balkans Enlargement: Common Destination, 2018: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/western-balkans-enlargement\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/western-balkans-enlargement_en.pdf) (13/03/18)

<sup>66</sup> Reuters, 2018 (a): <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-balkans/serbia-on-course-for-eu-by-2025-top-eu-official-says-idUSKBN1F80V8> (23/03/18)

<sup>67</sup> Euronews, 2018, *op. cit.*

## 4.4. The role of the Council of EU in the Accession Procedure

Acquiring the European Union membership, the “enlargement process”, is a complex and lengthy procedure, with which the state-candidate, as well as the institutions of the European Union, engage. The enlargement process is in accordance with the initial goals and declarations of the very first Treaties, which have always denoted that they are open towards welcoming “every European state”<sup>68</sup>. A main organ, responsible for EU enlargement and accession negotiation and procedures, is the General Affairs Council, which establishes and supervises the process as it develops.<sup>69</sup>

As aforementioned, eligibility for application is granted when a European country respects and promotes the democratic values of the Union, and primarily when it meets the “Copenhagen criteria”. Apart from those, during the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997, other international elements were added; the mutual commitment for peace, security and good neighbourly relations, respect to foreign states’ sovereignty and to the Union’s principles. State-candidates were also requested to solve their territorial differences using peaceful means, especially through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague<sup>70</sup>.

The new additions were set out in the “Stabilisation and Association process”, addressing the Balkan states’ application for membership<sup>71</sup>. The General Affairs Council’s (GAC) decisions open a technical evaluation procedure that, inter alia, determines whether the state meets the necessary for consideration as an official candidate for EU membership<sup>72</sup>. So, the candidate is requesting the Commission to evaluate its ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria, following an examining procedure. Given the fact that the Commission’s opinion is affirmative, the Council has then to agree upon a negotiating mandate. The latter takes place when the country officially becomes a membership candidate and the formal negotiation process follows. Again with the GAC’s decision, the formal membership negotiations can be opened and successfully closed<sup>73</sup>.

Negotiations, conducted by the Council Presidency, develop in an Accession Conference. The EP Foreign Affairs Committee holds regular exchanges of opinions with EU negotiators and negotiators of the candidate country<sup>74</sup>. This is the second out of the three stages of the whole procedure, which cannot begin until all EU members unanimously agree, through the decision of the EU Council. Ministers and ambassadors of the EU governments alongside with the candidate country take part in the negotiation process, which, at this point, is called “intergovernmental conference”<sup>75</sup>. The negotiations include discussions concerning the accession criteria, meaning both the conditions and the timing of the candidate’s adoption, implementation and enforcement of all current EU rules and legislation (the so-called “acquis”),

<sup>68</sup>Treaty of Rome, 1957, Preamble: “...Determined to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe...”

<sup>69</sup>Consilium Europa, 2018 (a): <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/gac/> (12/03/2018)

<sup>70</sup>Luxembourg European Council, 12 and 13 December 1997, Presidency Conclusions, available at European Parliament, 2018: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm) (06/03/18)

<sup>71</sup>European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (f), [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en) (06/03/18)

<sup>72</sup>Consilium Europa, 2018 (b): <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/> (12/3/2018)

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid*

<sup>74</sup>EU Accession Procedure”, *op. cit.*, p. 3

<sup>75</sup>European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (c), *op. cit.*



like any necessary economic reforms <sup>76</sup>. The findings that follow the examination process are presented by the Commission to the Member States as a screening report <sup>77</sup>.

In any case, the pace of the negotiations varies and depends on the speed of reform and adjustment with EU laws. Throughout the whole procedure, the EU Council is being informed by the Commission, using various means, such as reports, strategy papers and clarifications concerning the conditions for further progress <sup>78</sup>. The final accession stage cannot be reached, until, in the negotiation process, every single EU government is satisfied with the candidate's progress in the necessary policy field, as outlined by the Commission. Naturally, the whole negotiation process is logically concluded only after every chapter of the discussion has been addressed and closed <sup>79</sup>. Once the negotiations have reached a result that satisfies both the EU and the candidate, the country is able to join the EU. This consists the third part of the GAC's technical evaluation procedure, with which it can be decided whether the candidate member can, finally, join the Union or not <sup>80</sup>.

In the third and final stage, both sides sign the accession treaty, which consolidates the membership of the former candidate, now acceding state. It underlines the terms and conditions of the membership, transitional commitments, financial arrangements and safeguard clauses <sup>81</sup>. Nevertheless, this treaty is not final nor, more importantly, binding, until it meets certain criteria. First of all, it must be accepted by the EU Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament. Secondly, it must be signed by both the EU candidate and all, without any exception, existing EU countries. The Council is required to reach unanimity in order to act further, having previously consulted the Commission and acquired the consent of the European Parliament <sup>82</sup>.

When it comes to the accession of the Balkan States, the procedure moves as long as the candidate abides by its commitments in the stabilization process, which is explained later, in the following part. This guideline gives said countries the opportunity to build their capacity, as well as adopt and implement the EU legislation gradually and more smoothly, complying thus with the European and international, modern standards <sup>83</sup>.

<sup>76</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (f), *op. cit.*

<sup>77</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (c), *op. cit.*

<sup>78</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (f), *op. cit.*

<sup>79</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (c), *op. cit.*

<sup>80</sup> Consilium Europa, 2018 (b), *op. cit.*

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>82</sup> As it was mentioned in part 4.2.1., the institutional procedure for adopting an Accession treaty is set out in Article 49 TEU ("the Council must act unanimously after consulting with the Commission and receiving the consent of the European Parliament")

<sup>83</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (c), *op. cit.*

## 4.5. The framework of relations between the EU and the Western Balkan countries - the Stabilisation and Association Process

The EU is committed to the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro) as a long-term investment in peace, stability and growth. Demonstrating the crucial political importance attributed to the Western Balkans, the EU has put relations with the countries of the Western Balkans among its high priorities, with the main goal of helping their course towards European structures and standards. This interest is expressed through the Stabilisation and Association process, namely the EU's policy towards the Western Balkans, established with the aim of eventual EU membership. Western Balkan countries are involved in a progressive partnership with a view of stabilising the region and establishing a free-trade area<sup>84</sup>. Thus, the EU is also involved in the political and the security fields, apart from the economic one. Over the recent years, the EU has contributed effectively to the victory of democratic forces in Serbia, it had a leading role in averting a civil war in the FYROM and, also, took over from the UN the Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and from NATO the military mission in the FYROM.

### 4.5.1. Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA)

An important pillar of the Stabilisation and Association Process is the conclusion of individual Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). By signing an SAA, the Western Balkan countries commit: to gradual alignment to EU legislation in a number of areas to a gradual establishment of a free trade area with the EU to conclude bilateral agreements with their neighbours in the region on, for example, trade and free movement of workers, services and capital to co-operate with the EU on issues such as justice, visas, border control, illegal immigration, money laundering, transport, energy etc<sup>85</sup>.

### 4.5.2. Autonomous trade measures

By offering autonomous trade measures, the EU has already opened its market to nearly all products originating from the Western Balkan countries. The EU is now the region's largest trading partner, with over half of all exports going to the European market. Today more than 80% of all goods from the Western Balkans region enter Europe with no customs restrictions<sup>86</sup>.

### 4.5.3. Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)

The instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance consists the main funding mechanism of the EU, providing the enlargement countries with financial and technical help. Since 2007, it replaces a series of EU programmes and provides funds for progressive and positive developments, preparing the beneficiaries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, Kosovo<sup>87</sup>, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) for the EU membership demands.

<sup>84</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (g): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>85</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (h): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>86</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (i): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/association-trade-measures\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/association-trade-measures_en) (13/02/18) and Consilium Europa, 2018 (c): [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/76323.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/76323.pdf) (23/03/18)

<sup>87</sup> As explicitly stated in all EU documents and websites, the designation of Kosovo is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence, and it is used in this Study Guide as such

The financial assistance is provided through the following five chapters (as called “components”)

Transition assistance and institution building

1. Cross-border cooperation (CBC)
2. Regional development (transport, environment, regional and economic development)
3. Human resource development
4. Rural development <sup>88</sup>

#### 4.5.4. Regional Cooperation

Regional cooperation consists a priority of the stabilisation and association process, aiming to address shared challenges such as energy shortages, pollution, transport infrastructure, cross-border criminal activities, etc <sup>89</sup>. The main framework that controls the cooperation in South East Europe is the Regional Cooperation Council. It consists of a Secretariat based in Sarajevo and a Liaison Office in Brussels. Other than providing financial support, the EU also participates in the RCC through its representation by a representative of the European Commission and a representative of the European External Action Service. The RCC is also the “protector” of the South East European Cooperation Process, a forum for political and diplomatic dialogue. Initiated after the Yugoslavian wars, this forum numbers several members countries, including Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Slovenia as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey and Moldova <sup>90</sup>.

#### 4.6. EU Relations with the Western Balkans

The term Western Balkans is a political and geographical term, which, in the present Study Guide, refers to the six EU partner countries of the Western Balkans, namely Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo <sup>91</sup>. Actually, in 2014, the political leaders of the aforementioned countries met in Berlin, where they formally initiated the term Western Balkans Six (WB6) <sup>92</sup>. However, during the 1990s, when this term was initially employed, it included 8 states, 7 of which were part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and formed during its collapse (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), while the 8th state was Albania <sup>93</sup>.

<sup>88</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (j): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>89</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (k): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/regional-cooperation\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/regional-cooperation_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>90</sup> Regional Cooperation Council, 2018: <https://www.rcc.int/pages/2/about-us> (21/02/18)

<sup>91</sup> European External Action Service (EEAS), 2018 (a): [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39450/western-balkans-strategy-eu-sets-out-clear-path-accession\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39450/western-balkans-strategy-eu-sets-out-clear-path-accession_en) (14/02/18)

<sup>92</sup> European Commission, Mobility and Transport, 2018: [https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/international/enlargement/westernbalkans\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/international/enlargement/westernbalkans_en) (13/2/2018)

<sup>93</sup> Oxford Bibliographies, 2018: <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0094.xml> (13/02/18)



#### 4.6.1. The Thessaloniki European Council 2003

The key factor that led to the reduced number of the 6 states –besides the formation of Kosovo- that have still not been granted membership of the EU is the EU Thessaloniki Summit in 2003. During this summit, the Thessaloniki Agenda was adopted, which clearly stated that “[t]he future of the Balkans is within the European Union” and all six states of the Western Balkans were officially recognized as potential candidates, leaving no doubt on the concrete decision of the EU to integrate the Western Balkans<sup>94</sup>, whilst also taking measures to speed up the accession process<sup>95</sup>. Specifically, the Agenda confirmed the SAP –and, thus, the individual SAAs- as the cornerstone of the accession process, hence undoubtedly stating that the EU course of each state lies in its own actions, led by the SAAs<sup>96</sup>. Honoring these commitments, Slovenia in 2004 and Croatia in 2013 officially entered the Union, leaving behind the under discussion WB6.

#### 4.6.2. The Berlin Process

The Berlin Process is an initiative, inextricably linked with EU’s overall enlargement strategy, which targets to maintain the momentum of European integration in the Western Balkans. It was launched in 2014 by the German government and was firstly regarded as a time-limited (2014-2018) enlargement tool, taking into consideration the engagement of the EU in the region, due to the common heritage and history and to a future defined by shared opportunities and challenges. A small number of member states has since actually got involved (Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Slovenia), whereas others (Romania, Hungary, Greece), initially interested in joining the initiative, were not allowed to do so. All in all, 6 other states appear on the list of the future members (Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, F.Y.R.O.M., Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia)<sup>97</sup>. No specific institution, rather than the Member States themselves, is responsible of having oversight over the development of the overall project or monitoring its achievements. However, as time goes by, it seems to become one of the most important in terms of political, security and economic interest strategic movements of the EU.

The goal of this Process is to advance the EU’s agenda in several dimensions; economic growth and trade partnerships, good neighborly relations and regional cooperation, civil society development and intercultural interaction. The European Commission stated itself that “the Berlin Process can be instrumental for encouraging reforms and agreeing realistic priorities for core connectivity investments. It can also act as a spur to help resolve outstanding bilateral issues”<sup>98</sup>. Undoubtedly, the growth potential of the region along with the geopolitical criteria require the fulfilment of the infrastructure gap, the domination of democratic regimes and the elimination of destabilizing factors or of possible influences of growing powers such as Russia, Turkey, China or even the USA<sup>99</sup>. The need of transport, business and energy connectivity as pri-

<sup>94</sup> European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (g): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_PRES-03-163\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm) (13/02/18)

<sup>95</sup> Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Republic of Croatia, 2018: [http://www.mvep.hr/en/foreign-politics/multilateral-relationships/european-union-\(eu\)/the-eu-western-balkans-summit-of-thessaloniki/](http://www.mvep.hr/en/foreign-politics/multilateral-relationships/european-union-(eu)/the-eu-western-balkans-summit-of-thessaloniki/) (13/02/2018)

<sup>96</sup> Fouri, E., “Thessaloniki ten years on: Injecting momentum into the enlargement process for the Western Balkans”, CEPS Commentary, 16 May 2013, p. 1

<sup>97</sup> Marciacq, F., “The EU and the Western Balkans after the Berlin Process: Reflecting on the EU Enlargement in Times of Uncertainty”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2017 p. 3-5

<sup>98</sup> European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014–2015, Brussels, 8.10.2014, p. 17.

<sup>99</sup> Marciacq, F., *op. cit.*, p. 5

curities of the involved member-states makes investments and co-financing urgent. Under the framework of the Berlin Process the Reflection Forum is organized, in order to build a network between EU and the Western Balkans to pursue an on-going reflection on European politics<sup>100</sup>.

A unique enlargement policy, whose period is highly possible to be extended, encourages new perspectives towards the unending issue of the accession process and final integration of the Western Balkans.

### 4.6.3. Stage of Negotiations

#### I. Albania

##### a) Brief Recent History - Brief Facts

In 1912, Albania declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire, but soon enough, in 1939 it was conquered by Italy and later occupied by Germany in 1943. Following World War II and until the early 1990s, Albania was a communist and highly isolated state, under Enver Hoxha, allied with the USSR and, later, with China. In 1992, the decisive victory of the opposition initiated the democratic course of the country<sup>101</sup>, without, though, providing complete stability, the lack of which led to the emigration of many Albanians.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, in 2009, Albania joined NATO.<sup>103</sup> It is essential to underline, also, that Albania is the only state of the WB6 that did not emerge from the fall of Yugoslavia and thus it did not face the equivalent consequences.

Albania has a population of 3,047,987 (July 2017 est.)<sup>104</sup>, while the predominant ethnic group is Albanian and the predominant religion is Islam, followed by Christianity. Albania's GDP was measured to 11.864 billion \$ in 2016<sup>105</sup>. The country has a slowly growing economy but remains one of the poorest in Europe. A significant part of its revenue can be traced back to the remittances of migrant Albanians<sup>106</sup>.

##### b) Timeline of Negotiations

Albania submitted the official application for EU Membership in 2009 and the European Commission in its 2010 Opinion on the application estimated that Albania was not yet ready to start the official accession negotiations and should first comply with several crucial points mentioned in the Opinion. Three years later, in 2013, the Commission again denied granting Albania the status of a candidate country. But, in the same year, following the implementation of the most critical required reforms, the Commission recommended

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8

<sup>101</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018 (a): <https://www.britannica.com/place/Albania> (14/02/18)

<sup>102</sup> British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News, 2018 (a): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17679574> (12/02/18)

<sup>103</sup> Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, 2018 (a): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/al.html> (13/02/18)

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>105</sup> World Bank, 2018 (a): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/albania> (13/02/18)

<sup>106</sup> BBC News, 2018 (a), *op.cit.*

that Albania be officially recognized with an EU candidate status, which was finally granted in 2014 <sup>107</sup>. Moreover, in 2009, Albania and the EU signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement. It is worth mentioning that the EU is Albania's major trading partner, and, bearing in mind its weak economy, as well as its insufficient energy and transportation infrastructure, it is clear that Albania could be significantly benefited by a future in the EU. Essentially, some of those potential benefits have been already put in action, as the EU, from 2007 and on, has provided substantial financial assistance to Albania, in the form of loans, disaster relief, pre-accession funds, investment and budget support programs, whilst granting participation in Erasmus+ programs and Visa-free travel in the Schengen zone <sup>108</sup>.

However, the EU estimates that the state of Albania is not ready yet to be awarded membership, as the Union evaluates that there needs to be further compliance with the reforms agenda, deriving from the SAA, and especially in the fields of corruption and organized crime <sup>109</sup>. Most recently, on February 6th, 2018, the European Commission adopted a new strategy <sup>110</sup> on the Accession of the Western Balkans, focusing on six flagship initiatives (rule of law, security and migration, socio-economic development, transport and energy connectivity, digital agenda, reconciliation and good neighbourly relations), foreseen between 2018-2020. This strategy aims to encourage the Western Balkan states to strengthen their efforts and focus on the specific reforms, making clear that their future in the EU lies in their own hands. Concerning Albania, the Commission assesses that the state has made significant steps towards joining and that, once all the conditions required are met, the Commission will be ready to recommend the initiation of the accession negotiations.

## II. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

### a) Brief Recent History - Brief Facts

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, the lands that now belong to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were then incorporated into Serbia and, during WWI, those lands were occupied by Bulgaria. In 1991, FYROM declared its independence from Yugoslavia. It is considered worth noting that FYROM, along with Slovenia, were the two states that seceded rather peacefully from the Federal Republic <sup>111</sup>. Ten years later, the country was on the verge of a civil war, due to the uprising of ethnic Albanians, with the demand of greater rights for the Albanian minority <sup>112</sup>. On that path, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was adopted <sup>113</sup>. Nevertheless, a crucial problem of the state is that there still remains tension between the major population and the minority, while another vital issue is the name dispute between FYROM and Greece over the name "Macedonia", posing as a decisive obstacle for the state's membership of NATO and the EU <sup>114</sup>. It should be noted that negotiations between the government of Skopje and the govern-

<sup>107</sup> EEEAS, 2018 (b): [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/albania/press\\_corner/all\\_news/news/2014/20140624\\_01\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/albania/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20140624_01_en.htm) (12/02/18) and European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (l), [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/albania\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/albania_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>108</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (m): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_albania.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_albania.pdf) (12/02/18)

<sup>109</sup> BBC News, 2018 (b), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11283616> (13/02/18) and European Western Balkans, 2018 (a): <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2018/01/12/2018-crucial-year-albania-european-path/> (13/02/18)

<sup>110</sup> European Commission Press Release Database (h), [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-18-562\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-562_en.htm) (12/02/18)

<sup>111</sup> BBC News, 2018 (c): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17550407> (12/02/18)

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>113</sup> CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (b): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html> (12/03/18)

<sup>114</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018 (b): <https://www.britannica.com/place/Macedonia> (13/02/18)

ment of Athens over the name issue have been progressing in the first quarter of 2018 <sup>115</sup>, but it is unsure yet whether there will be a final solution. Additionally, the country experienced an extended and serious political crisis in the years of 2014-2017.

FYROM has a population of 2,103,721 (July 2017 est.) and has a notable Albanian minority of about 25%. The main religion is Orthodox Christianity, followed by a noteworthy Islam presence (about the 1/3 of the population) <sup>116</sup>. Regarding the state's economy, FYROM achieved a GDP of 10.9 billion \$ (2016) <sup>117</sup>. The growth of the national economy was stalled by the aforementioned internal crisis, while unemployment rates remain high; nonetheless, efforts are being made towards attracting foreign investments and meeting the criteria for EU membership <sup>118</sup>.

## b) Timeline of Negotiations

FYROM was the first of the WB6 to sign a SAA with the EU, in 2004. During the same year, it applied for membership and one year later the Council of the EU granted FYROM the official candidate status. In 2009, the Commission recommended the initiation of the accession negotiations, but in 2015 it added two conditions, under which the candidate is obliged to continue the implementation of the Przino Agreement <sup>119</sup> and to follow the "Urgent Reform Priorities" <sup>120</sup>.

FYROM's motives for joining the EU are similar to the ones of Albania, however, despite the fact that both countries have the same status, FYROM has more barriers to overcome, towards becoming an EU member. Specifically, Greece's veto <sup>121</sup>, the disputes with Bulgaria <sup>122</sup> and the pending reforms regarding democracy and the rule of law are truly hindering the accession process <sup>123</sup>. The Republic, though, has already received billions of euros in loans, investment leverage and pre-accession aid, while also participating in Erasmus+ and having been granted the Visa-free EU travel <sup>124</sup>.

<sup>115</sup> Deutsche Welle, 2018: <http://www.dw.com/en/breakthrough-over-macedonia-name-dispute-finally-in-sight/a-42185825> (23/03/18)

<sup>116</sup> CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (b), *op. cit.*

<sup>117</sup> World Bank, 2018 (b): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/macedonia-fyr> (13/02/18)/18)

<sup>118</sup> World Bank, 2018 (c): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/macedonia/overview#1> (12/02/18)

<sup>119</sup> European Commission, Agreement in Skopje to overcome political crisis, 2018: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agreement-skopje-overcome-political-crisis\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agreement-skopje-overcome-political-crisis_en) (13/02/18). The said agreement was an EU-facilitated agreement between the government of FYROM and its opposition, signed in July 2015. The EU intervened in the state after prolonged and acute domestic political conflict on the grounds of revelations of wire tapping and corruption acts committed by government officials

<sup>120</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (n): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia_en) (13/02/18)

<sup>121</sup> Reuters, 2018 (b): <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-macedonia-eu-greece/macedonia-wants-eu-membership-process-greek-talks-to-run-in-tandem-idUSKCN1BO2ON> (13/02/18)

<sup>122</sup> Bloomberg, 2018: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-01/bulgaria-republic-of-macedonia-sign-agreement-to-repair-relations> (14/02/18)

<sup>123</sup> POLITICO, 2018 (a): <https://www.politico.eu/article/the-race-for-eu-membership-neighborhood-turkey-uk-european-commission/> (13/02/18)

<sup>124</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (o): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-111enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_the\\_former\\_yugoslav\\_republic\\_of\\_macedonia.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-111enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf) (12/2/2018) and EEAS, 2018 (c): [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia/1457/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia-and-eu\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia/1457/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia-and-eu_en) (13/02/18)



Regarding the 6th of February strategy, the Commission has made for FYROM the equivalent remarks it underlined for Albania. Therefore, FYROM has to undergo the restructurings and improvements stated in the six flagships initiative, in order for the state to be able to enter the EU.

### III. Serbia

#### a) Brief Recent History - Brief Facts

FYROM, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991-1992. This break-up resulted in a civil war in the early 1990s, followed by UN sanctions. Following the collapse, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was formed in 1992, including Serbia – under Milosevic - and Montenegro. In the late 1990s, after Milosevic took over the Presidency of the FRY, an ethnic Albanian separatist movement broke out in the province of Kosovo, followed by an extremely violent response by Serbia, resulting in the flee of many ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, the intervention of NATO and the bombarding of Belgrade in 1999. In turn, that led in Serbia's defeat, Milosevic's fall from power in 2000 and Kosovo becoming a UN protectorate, but remaining a de jure part of Serbia, and, finally, Milosevic being charged with war crimes and the crime of genocide by the International Court of Justice. In 2006, Montenegro became independent, while Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, receiving partial recognition globally<sup>125</sup>. In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo signed a milestone agreement on the normalization of their bilateral relations<sup>126</sup>. Serbia's population reaches 7,111,024 (July 2017 est.), not including Kosovo. The vast majority of its citizens embrace Orthodox Christianity. In 2016, a GDP of 38.3 billion \$ was marked<sup>127</sup>. The turbulent events of the 1990s left the economy devastated, but since then, the liberalization of the economy has taken place and substantial reforms are being implemented, deriving from the agreements with the EU and the IMF<sup>128</sup>.

#### b) Timeline of Negotiations

The Republic of Serbia formally applied for the EU membership in 2009 and three years later, its initial hopes were met, as the state was granted the candidate status in 2012. The next year (2013), an SAA between Serbia and the Union was put into force and hopes for the actual membership continued to rise, due to the subsequent decision of the Council to open the accession negotiations, followed by the adoption of a negotiating framework and the 1st EU- Serbia Intergovernmental Conference in 2014<sup>129</sup>.

Regarding the negotiation process itself, there has been a gradual progress on a significant percentage of the 35 chapters of the acquis and by December 2017, 12 chapters had been opened, 2 of which had been provisionally closed.<sup>130</sup> The will for cooperation is evident also on the side of the Union, which has contributed noteworthy funds to the candidate state, in the forms mentioned above on the case of FYROM, but also towards university modernization. Furthermore, Serbia has been qualified for the participation in Erasmus+ and for a Visa-free travel in the EU, since 2009.<sup>131</sup>

<sup>125</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018 (c): <https://www.britannica.com/place/Serbia/Government-and-society#ref43576> (14/02/18) and CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (c): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html> (12/03/18)

<sup>126</sup> BBC News, 2018 (d): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17907947> (13/02/18)

<sup>127</sup> World Bank, 2018 (d): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/Serbia> (13/02/18)

<sup>128</sup> CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (c), op.cit. and World Bank, 2018 (e): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/serbia/overview#1> (12/02/18)

<sup>129</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (p): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia_en) (13/02/18) and European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (q): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_serbia.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_serbia.pdf) (13/02/18)

<sup>130</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (r): <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20160301-serbia-state-of-play.pdf> (13/02/18)

Notwithstanding the steps forward, certain impediments can be traced on the path towards a future in the Union. First and foremost, the issue with Kosovo has been severely hindering the process. Nevertheless, the groundbreaking deal with Kosovo in 2013 was able to win over the Union, which initiated the negotiations<sup>132</sup>. There still remains, though, tension between the two states, with Serbia refusing to recognize Kosovo, possibly until offered EU membership – a tactic that certainly does not comply with the EU spirit of cooperation<sup>133</sup>. Other obstacles have obstructed the way in the past, such as the then pending trials against Serbian war criminals by the ICJ<sup>134</sup>.

An ambitious goal was recently set by the European Commission, hoping to achieve the accession of Serbia –one of the two frontrunners for the membership– by 2025, under the fundamental condition of the legally binding normalization of the Belgrade-Pristina relations, accompanied by reforms in the sectors of the rule of law and of the economy<sup>135</sup>.

## IV. Montenegro

### a) Brief Recent History - Brief Facts

Montenegro existed as a part of Yugoslavia for the greatest part of the 20th century and, after the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic, it remained along with Serbia, forming the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992. This coalition evolved to be a loose State Union between Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, with the mediation of the EU. In 2006, Montenegro held a referendum with an outcome of 55% pro its independence and finally declared its independence on the 3rd of June 2006<sup>136</sup>.

Montenegro's population is rather small, at 642,550 (July 2017 est.), with a significant minority of Serbs (28.7%), Bosnians (8.7%), as well as of Albanians (4.9%). What is interesting –and consistent with the Balkan state's recent history– is that the official language is Montenegrin, however Serbian is more spoken, reaching almost 43%. The predominant religion is Orthodox Christianity, followed by a 20% of Muslims<sup>137</sup>. On the economic field, in the words of the World Bank (WB): *"In the latest European Commission (EC) Progress Report on Montenegro, the importance of maintaining macroeconomic stability was stressed, noting that the rapidly rising public debt and high fiscal deficits, together with high external imbalances and high unemployment, are of particular concern"*<sup>3</sup>. According to the World Bank's data, Montenegro's GDP in 2016 was 4.374 billion \$<sup>139</sup>.

<sup>131</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (q), *op. cit.*

<sup>132</sup> BBC News, 2018 (b), *op.cit.*

<sup>133</sup> POLITICO, 2018 (a), *op. cit.*

<sup>134</sup> Euobserver, 2018 (a): <https://euobserver.com/enlargement/26743> (13/02/18)

<sup>135</sup> European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (h), *op.cit.*

<sup>136</sup> CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (d): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/mj.html> (12/03/2018) and BBC News, 2018 (e): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17667132> (12/02/18)

<sup>137</sup> CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (d), *op. cit.*

<sup>138</sup> World Bank, 2018 (f): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/montenegro/overview#1> (12/02/18)

<sup>139</sup> World Bank, 2018 (g): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/montenegro> (13/02/18) .

## b) Timeline of Negotiations

Montenegro applied for membership in December 2008 and was granted official candidate status exactly 2 years later, after the enforcement of the SAA. In 2014, the accession negotiations opened and, since then, 30 out of the 35 chapters of the *acquis* have been opened, 3 of which preliminarily closed<sup>140</sup>. Concerning the EU support it has already received, Montenegro has reaped the equivalent benefits to Serbia. Montenegro is no exception in stumbling upon barriers on its way to EU accession, as corruption is severe and difficult to tackle with. Moreover, concerns are being raised for the consequences of a possible accession of Montenegro prior to Serbia's<sup>141</sup>. The state may be close to meeting its peoples' hopes for a EU future, but, withal the optimistic goal set for 2025, the Commission stresses the need for further actions in the areas of rule of law, corruption and organized crime<sup>142</sup>.

## V. Kosovo

### a) Brief Recent History - Brief Facts

During the Balkan Wars, Serbia regained control of Kosovo, which was, until then, under Ottoman rule. In 1946, the region became part of Yugoslavia, the constitution of which recognized Kosovo as an autonomous province, in 1974. This autonomous status remained until 1990, when Milosevic imposed Serbian administration on the region, an action that fueled a series of passive and later aggressive resistance of the Albanian Kosovars, met by violent Serbian crackdown, the consequences of which were mentioned above, in the Brief History of Serbia. In 1999, NATO launched a military operation, managing to achieve the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the region was placed under UN administration, under the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1244. In 2008, Kosovo, unilaterally and against Serbia's fierce opposition, declared its independence and, since then, has been recognized by more than 110 states<sup>143</sup>, the UN and several international organizations. In 2010, the ICJ ruled that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law. Serbia is persistently refusing to recognize Kosovo's independence, along with 5 other EU states (Greece, Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania)<sup>144</sup>. As mentioned before, a step of high importance was made in 2013, when Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement towards the normalization of their relationships<sup>145</sup>.

Kosovo is estimated to have a population of 1,895,250 (July 2017 est.). The major ethnic group is the Albanians (92.9%), followed by a 1.6% of Bosniaks and 1.5% of Serbs<sup>146</sup>. Accordingly, the predominant religion is Islam by 95.6%<sup>147</sup>. Congruous to its turbulent past and present, Kosovo's economy and infrastructure

<sup>140</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (s): <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180131-negotiations-status-montenegro.pdf> (13/02/18) and European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (t): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_montenegro.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_montenegro.pdf) (13/02/18)

<sup>141</sup> POLITICO, 2018 (a), *op. cit.*

<sup>142</sup> European Commission Press Release Database (h), *op. cit.*

<sup>143</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kosovo, 2018: <http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,224> (14/02/18)

<sup>144</sup> EU Observer, 2018 (b): <https://euobserver.com/enlargement/140878> (13/02/18)

<sup>145</sup> BBC News, 2018 (f): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18328859> (13/02/18)

<sup>146</sup> These estimates may under-represent Serb and other ethnic minorities because they are based on the 2011 Kosovo national census, which excluded northern Kosovo (a largely Serb-inhabited region) and was partially boycotted by Serb and Romani communities in southern Kosovo (2011 est.)

<sup>147</sup> CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (e): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html> (12/03/18)

is weak, but is continuing to grow year by year. The region's citizens are the second poorest in Europe; unemployment is high, while Kosovo has instituted the euro as its official currency <sup>148</sup>. In 2016, Kosovo's GDP was measured at 6.65 billion \$ <sup>149</sup>.

## b) Timeline of Negotiations

Kosovo is a potential **candidate** for a EU membership. The commencement of Kosovo's potential EU future can be traced back to 2008, when the Council acknowledged the declaration of Kosovo's independence, establishing, additionally the EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, EULEX <sup>150</sup>. The Union also materialized its will for contributing to the stability in the area by allotting a Special Representative in Kosovo. Recently, an SAA entered in to force (2016) <sup>151</sup>, succeeded by the Commission's proposal for Visa-free travel for the Kosovars. Actively supporting stability and growth, the Union has provided substantial funds in the form of loans, investment leverage and assistance, accompanied by employment and entrepreneurship training and grant for Erasmus+ participation <sup>152</sup>.

Regarding the future of Kosovo's efforts towards membership, it is crucial to underline that, despite the recognition of its efforts to comply with the requirements for the accession <sup>153</sup>, the deep corruption and the organized crime are booming in the region and the non-recognition of its de-facto independence by five EU countries <sup>154</sup> and its neighbor, Serbia, is not easy to overcome and remains a major obstacle. This difficulty is also reflected on the new Western Balkans policy of the 6th of February, where it is clear that, in order for Kosovo to be granted membership, the state needs to follow the SAA signed and only "once objective circumstances allow", it will be able to continue its journey towards membership, referring of course to the objective hindrance of several member states' objections <sup>155</sup>.

## VI. Bosnia and Herzegovina

### a) Brief Recent History - Brief Facts

Following World War II, the region became a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose breakup in 1991 led to a referendum (1992) in the region that decided its independence. However, the Bosnian Serbs were strongly against independence and responded with armed resistance. War broke out between 1992-1995, involving Bosnians, Serbs and Croats, resulting in the displacement of more than 2 million people. The peace agreement of the Dayton Accords <sup>156</sup> was finally signed in 1995 in Paris, with the help of international intervention. The Dayton-Paris Agreement ended the war and established a unique and extremely complicated governance system within the state, where two separate enti-

<sup>148</sup> World Bank, 2018 (h): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kosovo/overview> (13/02/18)

<sup>149</sup> World Bank, 2018 (i): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/kosovo> (13/02/18)

<sup>150</sup> EULEX-Kosovo, 2018: <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16> (14/02/18)

<sup>151</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (u): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/kosovo\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/kosovo_en) (14/02/18)

<sup>152</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (v): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_kosovo.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_kosovo.pdf) (14/02/18)

<sup>153</sup> European Commission – High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Joint Report to the European Parliament and Council on Kosovo's progress in addressing issues set out in the Council Conclusions of December 2012 in view of a possible decision on the opening of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement", Brussels, 22.4.2013

<sup>154</sup> Namely Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain

<sup>155</sup> European Commission Press Release Database (h), op. cit. and EU Observer, 2018 (b), op. cit.

<sup>156</sup> US Department of State, 2018: <https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/> (14/02/18)



ties exist: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Formally part of both entities is the Brcko District, a multi-ethnic self-governing administrative unit <sup>157</sup>. Those two entities' governments compose a second tier of government and are responsible for overseeing most government functions. The central government is a multiethnic, three-member presidency, consisting of one Serb, one Bosnian and one Croat, charged with conducting foreign, diplomatic, and fiscal policy. Additionally, the Dayton Accords established the Office of the High Representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement. The Peace Implementation Council at its conference in Bonn in 1997 also gave the High Representative the authority to impose legislation and remove officials, the so-called "Bonn Powers" <sup>158</sup>.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a population of 3,856,181 (July 2017 est.) <sup>159</sup>. The Federation is predominantly Bosniak (Muslims) and Croat (Catholics), while the Republika Srpska is Serb (Orthodox). Precisely, the population is dispersed as such: Bosniak 50.1%, Serb 30.8%, Croat 15.4% <sup>160</sup>. Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy and infrastructure were severely damaged by the 3-year war <sup>161</sup>, but growth is slowly being achieved. In 2016, according to World Bank data, the country marked a GDP of 16.91 billion \$ <sup>162</sup>.

The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has retained the status of a potential candidate since the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003. However, steps have been made towards a possible -though unlikely for now- EU membership, such as the entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Interim Agreement (2008) and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (2015), as well as the grant for visa liberalisation (2010). In 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its official membership application, met by the decision of the Council, inviting the Commission to issue an opinion on the application <sup>163</sup>.

Funding has also been provided, equivalent to that of the rest of the Balkan states <sup>164</sup>. Withal the pre-accession aid, the actual accession is a rather ambitious target, bearing in mind the complex governance system, which has been criticized for excluding minorities (Jews and Roma) from running for high office. Moreover, regarding this split-along-ethnic-lines state, the European Commission stated in its recent new strategy of February 6th the following: "*The Commission will start preparing an Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's membership application following receipt of comprehensive and complete answers to its Questionnaire. With sustained effort and engagement, Bosnia and Herzegovina could become a candidate for accession*" <sup>165</sup>. Therefore, the country has to fully commit to the six flagship initiatives and strive for a possible future in the European Union.

<sup>157</sup> The Guardian, 2018: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-elections-the-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government> (13/02/18)

<sup>158</sup> CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (f): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html> (13/03/18).

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>160</sup> The methodology remains disputed and Republika Srpska authorities refuse to recognize the results;

<sup>161</sup> BBC News, 2018 (g): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17211415> (12/02/18)

<sup>162</sup> World Bank, 2018, (j): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina> (13/02/18)

<sup>163</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (w): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/bosnia-herzegovina\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/bosnia-herzegovina_en) (14/02/18) and European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (x): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_bosnia\\_and\\_herzegovina.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf) (14/02/18)

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>165</sup> European Commission Press Release Database (h), *op. cit.*

#### 4.6.4. Points of Agreement and Disagreement

Albania, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia constitute candidates, a fact that means that the negotiations for the integration have either started or are going to start. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo on the other hand, are regarded as potential candidates, since they were promised the prospect of joining, when they are ready <sup>166</sup>, though, negotiations on their part haven't begun yet. On behalf of the already-existing member-states, Germany, France and the Benelux countries preferred to delay the integration process, since, in those countries, the fatigue over EU enlargement was a problem. On the contrary, other ones, such as, but not limited to, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Spain have been supporters of the enlargement initiative. Between the EU member-states, the strongest supporters of the Western Balkan enlargement in particular are Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy and Sweden <sup>167</sup>.

##### i) Albania

Membership status: Candidate country <sup>168</sup>

The possibility of receiving a positive assessment comes with the need to improve media freedom, to ensure the independence of judiciary, rule of law and the existence of stronger institutions and to struggle against organized crime and corruption. Its role in the migration crisis concentrates on finding an EU-wide solution to the greatest movement of peoples since World War II. Fears of a possible union between Kosovo and Albania that would trigger a new upheaval in the Balkans exist and make Bosnia and FYROM vulnerable, if borders were thought to be up for grabs once again. Alarmed by this rising instability and tension in the region, EU leaders last month reaffirmed their support for the European perspective of the country. Support for EU membership, in the meanwhile, in Albania remains high <sup>169</sup>.

##### ii) FYROM

Membership status: Candidate country <sup>170</sup>

With regard to the priorities related to the political criteria, FYROM has launched major reforms with the aim of protecting human rights, reinforcing democracy and the rule of law. The short-term priorities related to the economic criteria have been met to a significant extent. Relations with Greece have improved in the last years. Greece is the most important investor in the country, already from 2005 with a share of 57% of the total foreign investments, and trade has been constantly increasing <sup>171</sup>. Nevertheless, FYROM's president describes his country as a nation "stuck in an elevator" mainly because the negotiations with the EU require an agreement regarding the naming dispute with Greece. Relations with Croatia and the neighboring countries of Albania and Greece are at a good level and have been developing in the last few years, fostered by the countries' common European aspirations. Progress regarding the priorities concerning the ability to assume the obligations of membership has been uneven <sup>172</sup>. The country's future as an EU member remains to be seen.

<sup>166</sup> European Commission, Strategy for the Western Balkans, 2018: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en) (13/03/18)

<sup>167</sup> Bugajski (ed.), "Western Balkans policy review 2010", Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017, p. 17

<sup>169</sup> POLITICO, 2018 (b): <https://www.politico.eu/article/albania-prime-minister-edi-rama-eu-faces-nightmare-if-balkans-denied/> (13/03/18)

<sup>170</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (o), *op. cit.*

<sup>171</sup> Commission of the European Communities, Analytical Report for the Opinion on the application from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for EU Membership, Brussels, 9.11.2005, p. 33

<sup>172</sup> Bugajski (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 88-89

### iii) Serbia

Membership status: Candidate country

Issues discussed: Chapters 25, 26

Pending Issues Chapters 5, 20, 23, 24, 32, 35 <sup>173</sup>

Along with Croatia, Serbia proved to be emblematic of their general policies and overall political stances. Though, it is considered as essential to terminate any political conditionality and to solve the impasse over Kosovo's status. The EU views Serbia's accession as vital to regional stability but is divided over Kosovo's status and therefore does not require Serbia to recognize Kosovo and instead it has been asked to make concessions. Another obstacle to the procedure is also its low European identification unlike some other Western Balkans countries such as Macedonia and Albania <sup>174</sup>.

### iv) Montenegro

Membership status: Candidate country

Issues discussed: Chapters 1-30

Pending Issues: Chapters 8, 17, 27

Currently non- applicable: Chapters 34, 35 <sup>175</sup>

Montenegro was once seen as a leading EU candidate, thanks to its political and social progress. However, the financial recession put a pressure on reformers in the Balkans, and, especially, Montenegro, as there was a decline of investments from Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy <sup>176</sup>. It is high time for Europe to balance the situation between internal problems and enlargement. On that track, last year, there was a Slovakia-spearheaded idea about accepting Montenegro through an urgent procedure in the EU, due to great Russian influence in the country. Slovakia also criticized those in the EU who were against enlargement, as far as it is an effective instrument for political and economic growth <sup>177</sup>.

### v) Kosovo

Membership status: Potential Candidate <sup>178</sup>

The EU does not possess the legal capacity of diplomatic recognition of states, as member-states do so individually. The majority of them have recognized Kosovo, apart from Cyprus, Slovakia, Greece, Romania and Spain, as it was already mentioned. To activate a common EU policy requires unanimity, which does not presently exist. In 2010, the European Parliament adopted a resolution welcoming "the recognition by all Member States of the independence of Kosovo", and encouraging them to "step up their common approach towards Kosovo" <sup>179</sup>. Thus, it rejected the possibility of a participation of Kosovo.

<sup>173</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (q), *op. cit.*

<sup>174</sup> European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Serbia 2016 Report, Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, Brussels, 9.11.2016 and European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy, Brussels, 10.11.2015

<sup>175</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (t), *op. cit.*

<sup>176</sup> Bugajski (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 96

<sup>177</sup> European Western Balkans, 2018 (b): <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/03/20/montenegro-to-join-eu-through-urgent-procedure/> (13/03/18)

<sup>178</sup> Bugajski (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 88-89

<sup>179</sup> European Parliament, 2018: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0262+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (13/03/18)

A new resolution that urged the five EU member-states that had not recognized Kosovo's independence to do so, followed. Cyprus, as well as Greece, seem to be committed to further advancing its European perspective. Romania, Spain and Slovakia have started to alter their stance, in order to support its membership and the European perspective of the region. Taking these facts into consideration, it remains to be seen whether its possible recognition will lead the way to its integration into the European Union.

#### vi) Bosnia and Herzegovina

Membership status: Potential Candidate <sup>180</sup>

There was a continuous positive and successful prosecution of war crimes cases. The result given through the 'Berlin process', notably on the EU's connectivity agenda, continued to foster increased regional cooperation and to prioritize the list of investment projects in the transport sector <sup>181</sup>. Relations with other countries remain good. Bosnia and Herzegovina is still at an early stage at the development of a functioning economy, something that remains a restriction to its full integration.

<sup>180</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (x), *op. cit.*

<sup>181</sup> European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016 Report, Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, Brussels, 9.11.2016

## 4.7. Points to be addressed

- Which were the lessons from the latest (21st century) rounds of enlargement? What exactly did the EU learn? How can those lessons be applied in the Western Balkans?
- Should the enlargement process be accelerated, in order for the benefits to be reaped or should the integration of those countries be gradually and carefully continued?
- Where does the EU stand and where should it stand, according to its values, as far as the broader debate of “interests vs values” and the consequent question of “political and economic stability and security vs. democracy” are concerned?
- Should the Western Balkan countries be seen as equal partners? Should and/or can the cooperation between the EU and those countries be supported in some sectors (energy, road networks etc), even though they are not members yet?
- What is the role of other (regional or global) powers in the Western Balkans, such as China, Russia, Turkey and the US? Do they hinder or favor the WB6 European course and to what extent?





## 4.8. Bibliography

### Primary sources

Commission of the European Communities, 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, Brussels, 9.11.2005

Commission of the European Communities, Analytical Report for the Opinion on the application from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for EU Membership, Brussels, 9.11.2005

Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007, Including annexed the special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members, Brussels, 8.11.2006

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C115, Volume 51, 9 May 2008

European Commission – High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Report to the European Parliament and Council on Kosovo’s progress in addressing issues set out in the Council Conclusions of December 2012 in view of a possible decision on the opening of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement”, Brussels, 22.4.2013

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, Brussels, 10.10.2012

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014–2015, Brussels, 8.10.2014

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy, Brussels, 10.11.2015

European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Serbia 2016 Report, Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, Brussels, 9.11.2016

European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016 Report, Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, Brussels, 9.11.2016

Luxembourg European Council, 12 and 13 December 1997, Presidency Conclusions, available at European Parliament, 2018: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm) (06/03/18)

Treaty of Rome, 1957

## Secondary sources

### A) Articles

Balfour R. and Stratulat C., “The enlargement of the European Union”, *European Policy Center Discussion Paper*, 10 December 2012

Börzel T. A., Dimitrova A. and Schimmelfennig F., “European Union enlargement and integration capacity: concepts, findings, and policy implications”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 24, Issue 2, p. 157–176

Bugajski (ed.), “Western Balkans policy review 2010”, *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, 2017

Emerson M. et al., “Just what is this ‘absorption capacity’ of the European Union?”, *CEPS policy brief*, No. 113, September 2006

Fouéré, E., “Thessaloniki ten years on: Injecting momentum into the enlargement process for the Western Balkans”, *CEPS Commentary*, 16 May 2013

Marciacq, F., “The EU and the Western Balkans after the Berlin Process: Reflecting on the EU Enlargement in Times of Uncertainty”, *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, 2017

Szolucha A., “The EU and Enlargement Fatigue: Why has the European Union not been able to counter enlargement fatigue?”, *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, Volume 6, Issue 1, p. 1-16

### B) Internet sources

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News, 2018 (a): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17679574> (12/02/18)

BBC News, 2018 (b), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11283616> (13/02/18)

BBC News, 2018 (c): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17550407> (12/02/18)

BBC News, 2018 (d): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17907947> (13/02/18)

BBC News, 2018 (e): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17667132> (12/02/18)

BBC News, 2018 (f): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18328859> (13/02/18)

BBC News, 2018 (g): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17211415> (12/02/18)

Bloomberg, 2018: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-01/bulgaria-republic-of-macedonia-sign-accord-to-repair-relations> (14/02/18)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, 2018 (a): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/al.html> (13/02/18)

CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (b): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html> (12/03/18)

CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (c): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html> (12/03/18)

CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (d): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/mj.html> (12/03/2018)

CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (e): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html> (12/03/18)

CIA, The World Factbook, 2018 (f): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html> (13/03/18)

Consilium Europa, 2018 (a): <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/gac/> (12/03/2018)

Consilium Europa, 2018 (b): <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/> (12/3/2018)

Consilium Europa, 2018 (c): [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/76323.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/76323.pdf) (23/03/18)

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018 (a): <https://www.britannica.com/place/Albania> (14/02/18)

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018 (b): <https://www.britannica.com/place/Macedonia> (13/02/18)

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018 (c): <https://www.britannica.com/place/Serbia/Government-and-society#ref43576> (14/02/18)

“EU Accession Procedure”, Library Briefing 26/03/13, Library of the European Parliament: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130437/LDM\\_BRI\(2013\)130437\\_REV3\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130437/LDM_BRI(2013)130437_REV3_EN.pdf) (13/02/18)

EU Business 2018: <https://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/politics-juncker.x29> (13/02/18)

EU Observer, 2018 (a): <https://euobserver.com/enlargement/26743> (13/02/18)

EU Observer, 2018 (b): <https://euobserver.com/enlargement/140878> (13/02/18)

EULEX-Kosovo, 2018: <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16> (14/02/18)

EUR-Lex, 2018: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession\\_criteria\\_copenhagen.html](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhagen.html) (13/02/18)

Euronews, 2018: <http://www.euronews.com/2018/03/02/jean-claude-juncker-and-eu-enlargement-fatigue> (05/03/2018)

European Commission, Agreement in Skopje to overcome political crisis, 2018: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agreement-skopje-overcome-political-crisis\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agreement-skopje-overcome-political-crisis_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (a): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (b): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis_en) (13/02/2018)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (c), [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/steps-tow3333ards-joining\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/steps-tow3333ards-joining_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (d), [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/screening\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/screening_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (e): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-negotiations\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-negotiations_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (f), [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en) (06/03/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (g): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (h): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (i): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/association-trade-measures\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/association-trade-measures_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (j): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (k): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/regional-cooperation\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/regional-cooperation_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (l), [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/albania\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/albania_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (m): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_albania.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_albania.pdf) (12/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (n): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (o): <https://>

[ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-111enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_the\\_former\\_yugoslav\\_republic\\_of\\_macedonia.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-111enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (p): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia_en) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (q): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_serbia.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_serbia.pdf) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (r): <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20160301-serbia-state-of-play.pdf> (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (s): <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180131-negotiations-status-montenegro.pdf> (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (t): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_montenegro.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_montenegro.pdf) (13/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (u): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/kosovo\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/kosovo_en) (14/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (v): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_kosovo.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_kosovo.pdf) (14/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (w): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/bosnia-herzegovina\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/bosnia-herzegovina_en) (14/02/18)

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2018 (x): [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near\\_factograph\\_bosnia\\_and\\_herzegovina.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf) (14/02/18)

European Commission, Mobility and Transport, 2018: [https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/international/enlargement/westernbalkans\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/international/enlargement/westernbalkans_en) (13/2/2018)

European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (a): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-06-797\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-06-797_en.htm) (05/03/2018)

European Commission Press Release Database 2018 (b): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-09-245\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-245_en.htm) (13/02/18)

European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (c): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-11-463\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-463_en.htm) (13/02/18)

European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (d): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-13-195\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-195_en.htm) (13/02/18)

European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (e): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-13-735\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-735_en.htm) (13/02/18)

European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (f): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-17-3165\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm) (13/02/18)

European Commission Press Release Database, 2018 (g): [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_PRES-03-163\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm) (13/02/18)

European Commission Press Release Database (h), [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-18-562\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-562_en.htm) (12/02/18)

European Commission, Strategy for the Western Balkans, 2018: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en) (13/03/18)

European Commission, Western Balkans Enlargement: Common Destination, 2018: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/western-balkans-enlargement\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/western-balkans-enlargement_en.pdf) (13/03/18)

European External Action Service (EEAS), 2018 (a): [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39450/western-balkans-strategy-eu-sets-out-clear-path-accession\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39450/western-balkans-strategy-eu-sets-out-clear-path-accession_en) (14/02/18)

EEAS, 2018 (b): [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/albania/press\\_corner/all\\_news/news/2014/20140624\\_01\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/albania/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20140624_01_en.htm) (12/02/18)

EEAS, 2018 (c): [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia/1457/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia-and-eu\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia/1457/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia-and-eu_en) (13/02/18)

European Parliament, 2018: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0262+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (13/03/18)



European Western Balkans, 2018 (a): <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2018/01/12/2018-crucial-year-albania-european-path/> (13/02/18)

European Western Balkans, 2018 (b): <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/03/20/montenegro-to-join-eu-through-urgent-procedure/> (13/03/18)

Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Republic of Croatia, 2018: [http://www.mvep.hr/en/foreign-politics/multilateral-relationships/european-union-\(eu\)/the-eu-western-balkans-summit-of-thessaloniki/](http://www.mvep.hr/en/foreign-politics/multilateral-relationships/european-union-(eu)/the-eu-western-balkans-summit-of-thessaloniki/) (13/02/2018)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kosovo, 2018: <http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,224> (14/02/18)

Oxford Bibliographies, 2018: <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0094.xml> (13/02/18)

POLITICO, 2018 (a): <https://www.politico.eu/article/the-race-for-eu-membership-neighborhood-turkey-uk-european-commission/> (13/02/18)

POLITICO, 2018 (b): <https://www.politico.eu/article/albania-prime-minister-edi-rama-eu-faces-nightmare-if-balkans-denied/> (13/03/18)

Regional Cooperation Council, 2018: <https://www.rcc.int/pages/2/about-us> (21/02/18)

Reuters, 2018 (a): <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-balkans/serbia-on-course-for-eu-by-2025-top-eu-official-says-idUSKBN1F80V8> (23/03/18)

Reuters, 2018 (b): <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-macedonia-eu-greece/macedonia-wants-eu-membership-process-greek-talks-to-run-in-tandem-idUSKCN1BO2ON> (13/02/18)

The Guardian, 2018: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-elections-the-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government> (13/02/18)

US Department of State, 2018: <https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/> (14/02/18)

World Bank, 2018 (a): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/albania> (13/02/18)

World Bank, 2018 (b): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/macedonia-fyr> (13/02/18)

World Bank, 2018 (c): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/macedonia/overview#1> (12/02/18)

World Bank, 2018 (d): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/Serbia> (13/02/18)

World Bank, 2018 (e): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/serbia/overview#1> (12/02/18)

World Bank, 2018 (f): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/montenegro/overview#1> (12/02/18)

World Bank, 2018 (g): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/montenegro> (13/02/18)

World Bank, 2018 (h): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kosovo/overview> (13/02/18)

World Bank, 2018 (i): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/kosovo> (13/02/18)

World Bank, 2018, (j): <https://data.worldbank.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina> (13/02/18)



## 5. Organisers

### 5.1 The Institute of European Integration and Policy

The Institute of European Integration and Politics is an independent, non-profit research and educational institution. It was founded in 2002 under the auspices of the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Athens.

Its main mission is to cover the teaching and research needs of the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration in the fields of European integration and politics, to initiate teaching activities, to cooperate and exchange scientific knowledge with other academic or research centres in Greece and abroad, to organize seminars, lectures and to forge publications. For these purposes the Institute:

- Conducts research on topics concerning European integration and politics with emphasis on European economic policy and governance, institutional and political system of the European Union, external relations of the EU, energy and environmental policy
- Provides information and conducts scientific analysis on the abovementioned issues
- Organises summer school courses on contemporary issues related with European integration and politics
- Organises simulations of the EU institutions in order to enhance the familiarization of the students with their function
- Cooperates with national and international research institutes and networks
- Organises PhD seminars on methodology

More information at: [en.eeep.pspa.uoa.gr](http://en.eeep.pspa.uoa.gr)

### 5.2. The Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration

The Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Athens, although founded in 1982, can trace its origins back to the beginnings of the University of Athens in 1837. It evolved out of the Chair of Political Science at the Faculty of Law (which was one of the first faculties of the oldest Balkan university) into an independent academic department. This happened a few years after the Chairs of Political Economy, which were founded in the late 19th century, evolved into the Faculty of Economics in the 1970s. This reform of the School of Law, which was then renamed the School of Law, Economics and Political Science, transformed it into a higher education institution awarding since the early 1980s, three separate degrees corresponding to the titles of its faculties. This change was a genuine expression of the tradition of the School, which was not only the center of legal studies in Greece, but also the centre of the emergence and cultivation of the economic and social sciences since the middle of the 19th century. The School preserved this role for more than a century, until the 1980s, when social science departments emerged in other newly founded Greek universities. It is within this School that the first chairs of political economy have been created and retained their unique role until the 1920s. It is also within this School that one of the first chairs in sociology was established in the same decade. It is thus no coincidence that internationally renowned social scientists like Cornelius Castoriades or Nicos Poulantzas belong to the alumni. It is also extremely rare to find a democratically elected Prime Minister of Greece in the 20th century who does not hold a degree from the School of Law, Economics and Political Science, as it called now and to which the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration belongs.

### 5.3. The National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

The National and Kapodistrian University of Athens is the largest educational state institution in Greece, and among the largest universities of Europe. With a student body of about 125,000 undergraduate and postgraduate students over 2.000 members of academic staff and approximately 1,300 administrative and secretarial staff and specialized personnel, the University of Athens aims at excellence in both teaching and research in a significantly varied range of disciplines.

The University of Athens, established on the 3rd of May 1937, was first housed in a neoclassical residence, on the northeastern side of the Acropolis, renovated today and operating as the University Museum. Initially named “Othonian University” after Greece’s first King, Othon, it consisted of 4 academic units and 52 students. As it was the first university in the newly established modern Greek state, as well as in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean region, its socio-historically significant role has been decisive for the production of particular knowledge and culture in the country.

Until the early part of the 20th century, the University of Athens was the only university in Greece that provided the Greek society with qualified professionals in medicine, in physics and social sciences, in law and economics, in archeology and in education as well as in the clergy. In its many years of operation, it has offered the country a centre of intellectual production, stimulating intellectual circles functioning inside and outside its premises. Moreover, it has and still offers important social services as its academic staff regularly serves on national and international committees, carries out educational and other research projects, plans and takes part in seminars for a variety of social groups, oftentimes in addition to their full-time work at University.

## 5.4. Organising team

### **Emmanuella Doussis**

Emmanuella Doussis graduated from the University of Athens and continued her postgraduate studies at the University Paris I, Panthion-Sorbonne with a DEA (Diplôme d'Etudes Approfondies) in International Law and International Organisations and a DEA in Environmental Law. She completed her studies with a PhD in International Law.

She works as Associate Professor in the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. She lectures on International Organisation, United Nations System, Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes and International Environmental Law. She has been a visiting professor at the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the University of Dijon (France) and at the Faculty of Law of the University of Grenoble, where she lectured on selected issues of the law of the sea and international justice. She has also been a visiting fellow at the European University Institute in Florence (Global Governance Programme).

She is a member of the International Law Association International Committee on Role of International Law in Sustainable Natural Resource Management for Development. She is also member of the French Association of International Law and Academic Coordinator of the Jean Monnet module on “Moving the EU forward” (2015-2018). Her most recent book concerns the climate diplomacy. She has written several articles, in french, english and greek.

### **Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos**

Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos is a political scientist/sociologist who has studied law and sociology in Athens, in London (LSE) and in USA (Yale, Ph.D.) His main research interests lie in the fields of political science and in particular of comparative political sociology, including the study of state bureaucracy, welfare state, democracy, education and social policy and civil society in Greece, Southern Europe and South-Eastern Europe. He has a long teaching experience on these issues, on which he has taught in Greek, British and Spanish Universities. Currently, he is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Research Associate of the Hellenic Observatory of the London School of Economics. Moreover, he has conducted research as research fellow at the Hellenic Foundation of European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP, Athens), at the LSE, at St. Antony's College of Oxford University and at the Sciences Po, Paris. In addition to his long publication record, Dr. Sotiropoulos he has been coordinating editor of the “Greek Review of Political Science”.

### **Dr. Lydia Avrami**

She is Project Coordinator of the Jean Monnet Module “Moving the EU Forward” and Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). She studied Political Science and Public Administration (BSc) and European and International Studies (MSc) at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. She was awarded with distinction her Ph.D. in European climate change policy from the University of Athens (2015) and she was Scholar of the A.G. Leventis Foundation (2011-2014). She was Visiting Researcher at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) in Germany (January-May 2014) and received a short-term research scholarship from State Scholarships Foundation (IKY). She has also worked for communication, congress and event management companies (2007-2010). Her research interests focus on energy and climate change policy, European governance, policy effectiveness and the role of interest groups.

### **Othon Kaminiaris**

Othon Kaminiaris was born in 1992 and is a graduate of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He holds a Master in International and European Studies from the same Department and has attended several seminars and conferences relevant to his field of studies. Besides his mother tongue, Greek, he speaks English, French and Spanish. He is a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute of European Integration and Policy and a board member of the Political Science and Public Administration Alumni Association (SAPEDD) and President of the Communication and Events Committee. He is also the deputy director and a researcher of the SAPEDD's "ECOSOC group", founded for the Association's special consultative status to the organ.

### **Danai Konstantinidou**

She is a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute of European Integration and Policy and graduate student of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. She holds an MSc on International and European Studies from the abovementioned Department. Her research interests focus on social policy, climate change and European integration. Her mother language is Greek and she also speaks English and French.

### **Georgios I. Grigorakis**

Georgios (Yorgos) is a BSc Political Scientist and currently a postgraduate student of South East European Studies in the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. His experience mainly entails participation in and organization of Model International Organization conferences in Greece and abroad (Model United Nations, Model European Union, European Youth Parliament). He is also a frequent columnist on International Relations, Security and Strategy analysis issues. Proficient in English, fluent in French and a native speaker of Greek, he is also closely following developments in the wider region, planning to initiate research on Globalization, Europeanization and Security. Privileged enough to be born after the Yugoslav Wars, he envisions peaceful cooperation, integration and a greater Global Role for the Eastern Mediterranean. Training new generations of experts on the basis of these ideals is his driving force on organizing this year's Athens EU Model.

### **Vasiliki – Sofia Dritsa**

Vasiliki – Sofia Dritsa is 22 years old. Currently, she studies law at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens School and works as an intern in the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She has participated in many Simulations, such as MUN and MEU, and she is more than committed to European law and International - Foreign relations. Thus, she is also director for Internal Management at the European Law Students' Association of Greece (ELSA Greece).

### **Anastasia-Alexandra Sfika**

Besides an undergraduate student of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Athens, Anastasia-Alexandra Sfika is also an active debater and a citizen of the world. Her passions vary, from traditional dances to intense conferences. According to her, travelling is a way of learning and every new travel is a challenge. Being a diplomat was always a dream of hers, and she came close while spending her summer in Germany for attending workshops, MUNing and debating. Even though her plans for the future are still vague, she would love to obtain a master in Human Resources. Having faced different types of people through her experiences, she believes that being open-minded and receptive are the two principals of cooperation.

## **Vasiliki Festa**

Vasiliki Festa was born and raised in Thessaloniki. She is an undergraduate student of Law, currently in her third year of studies in the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. While highly interested in her field of studies, she also tries to satisfy her interest in international law by taking part in respective conferences. Starting from her high school years, she has participated in many simulations and hopes that this year's Athens EU Model will be the best experience so far.

## **Tatiana Kyttaroudi**

She is an undergraduate at the Law Faculty of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Coming from a small town of northern Greece, it was not always easy for her to find opportunities and participate in conferences and simulations. When in university, she met people that had started their MEU/MUN journey since their high school years. But never in one single moment did she feel that she was left behind. It is her firm belief that no matter the quantity of conferences one has taken part in, the driving force behind delivering results of good quality is not the experience, rather than the passion. Passion can overcome inexperience and actually gives you more motivation to work hard and catch up with "time lost".





## 6. Useful Information

### 6.1. The City of Athens

#### **The cradle of European culture**

Athens is considered to be the historic capital of Europe as its values and its culture crossed the geographical borders of the city and spread worldwide (in the 5th century B.C.). Political thinking, theater, arts, philosophy, science, architecture and so many other human intellectualities reached their zenith in a unique time coincidence and spiritual completion. In this sense, Athens became the cradle of European culture and civilization, while many Greek words and concepts such as democracy, harmony, music, mathematics, art, gastronomy, architecture, logic, Eros, euphoria and many more, enriched various languages and inspired different civilizations.

#### **Athens: back to the future**

Athens is distinguished by its outstanding prestige, despite its long and rich history and various conquests. It can be said that Athens is a European capital where past “nourishes” the present and they co-exist harmonically. Since 1834, Athens has been the capital of the modern Greek state and it has developed into a modern metropolitan center of incomparable charm and great interest. Visiting Athens is a unique experience. It is a “journey” to a 6.000 years history in one of the most beautiful natural landscapes (“lacy” coastlines, beaches and mountains), enlightened by the bright sunlight of Attica sky. For a short journey to Athens’ history, [click here](#).

More information are available at [www.cityofathens.gr/en/](http://www.cityofathens.gr/en/)

#### **Around neighborhoods of the historical center**

The “core” of the historic centre is the Plaka neighborhood (at the eastern side of the Acropolis), which has been inhabited without interruption since antiquity. When you walk through the narrow labyrinthine streets lined with houses and mansions from the time of the Turkish occupation and the Neoclassical period (19th c.), you will have the impression of travelling with a “time machine”. You will encounter ancient monuments, such as the Lysikrates Monument, erected by a wealthy donor of theatrical performances, the Roman Agora with the famed “Tower of the Winds” (1st c. B.C.) and Hadrian’s Library (132 A.D.), scores of bigger and smaller churches, true masterpieces of Byzantine art and architecture, as well as remnants of the Ottoman period (Fetihie Mosque, Tzistaraki Mosque, the Turkish Bath near the Tower of the Winds, the Muslim Seminary, et al.). There are also some interesting museums (Folk Art, Greek Children’s Art, Popular Musical Instruments, Frysira Art Gallery, etc.), lots of picturesque tavernas, cafis, bars, as well as shops selling souvenirs and traditional Greek products.

## 6.2. TOP 10 things to do in Athens

1. Walk uphill to see the Acropolis
2. Visit the Acropolis Museum
3. Shop around Monastiraki's flea market
4. Visit the Ancient Agora
5. Enjoy the nightlife around Agia Eirini's Square
6. Take a stroll top-down Ermou Str. for shopping and take a break for a coffee at Thisio or Gazi
7. Have a coffee in a cafe at Karytsi Square
8. Taste the Greek traditional cuisine in Plaka and Metaxourgeio
9. Visit Syntagma square, the Greek Parliament, and the National Gardens
10. Visit the Attica Zoological Park in Athens

## 6.3. Before you travel to Greece

- Depending on your country of origin you might need a passport or a visa
- Call your bank or your credit card company to let them know that you will be using it in Greece.
- In order to have access to necessary health care, tourists from member states of the European Union (EU) wishing to visit Greece must be holders of the European Health Card (EHIC) or any other legal Community document issued by their competent social security agency. Tourists from countries other than the member states of the European Union must consult their social security agency for information before travelling.
- Contact your phone company in order to make sure that you can use your mobile phone in Greece.
- The international calling code of Greece is +30.

## 6.4. Information and emergency phone numbers in Greece

**Ambulance Service: 166**

**SOS Doctors: 1016**

**Duty Hospitals and Clinics: 1434**

**Pharmacies: 1434**

**Open Line for alcohol drug Addiction: 210 3617089**

**Poisoning First Aid: 210 7793777**

**Police: 100**

**Tourist Police: 1571**

## 7. Contact details

### **Institute of European Integration and Policy (IEIP)**

42-44, Aiolou str. Monastiraki area, 105 60 Athens (3rd floor)

tel.: 210 368 8945, 210 368 8963

e-mail: info-eeep@pspa.uoa.gr

© Institute of European Integration and Policy (IEIP)

**Athens:** 2018

**Creative:**

Stefania Sachinoglou / stefiviii@yahoo.gr

